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This paper considers a long-standing question in the field of Industrial Orga-
nization: Can an incumbent firm price and advertise so as to deter entry that
otherwise would be profitable? For the most part, the first economists to con-
sider this question give aﬃrmative answers.1 Braithwaite (1928) and Robinson
(1933) oﬀer early informal remarks in support of the view that advertising has
an entry-deterrence eﬀect. Bain (1949) provides an early argument that an in-
cumbent may deter entry by limit pricing (i.e., by pricing below the monopoly
price), and Williamson (1963) later develops an analogous argument that an in-
cumbent can deter entry by committing to a low price and a high advertising
level. Important early empirical contributions by Bain (1956) and Comanor and
Wilson (1967, 1974) oﬀer inter-industry evidence that is broadly consistent with
the hypothesis that advertising by established firms generates an entry barrier.
Subsequent work, however, suggests that early economists exaggerate the
entry-deterring eﬀects of incumbent pricing and advertising selections. As Need-
ham (1976) argues, the incumbent’s pre-entry behavior deters entry only if some
link exists between this behavior and the potential entrant’s expected post-entry
profit. A link is clearly present if the incumbent can commit to maintain its
pre-entry price and advertising in the event of entry, but an assumption that the
incumbent can make such a commitment seems implausible. Further, as Demsetz
(1973, 1974), Nelson (1974) and others argue, the early empirical eﬀorts suﬀer
from fundamental endogeneity and measurement problems.
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1See Bagwell (2005) for a comprehensive survey of the economic analysis of advertising.
Recent work uses game-theoretic models to reconsider whether limit pricing
and advertising may deter entry. One set of work emphasizes that pre-entry
advertising by the incumbent may play a commitment role if it provides consumers
with durable information concerning, e.g., the incumbent’s existence or location.
Schmalensee (1983), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Ishigaki (2000) develop
models of this kind. The surprising conclusion is that, if an incumbent can deter
entry with a distortion in its pre-entry advertising, then it does so by distorting
its pre-entry advertising downward.
A second set of work proposes an informational link between the incumbent’s
pre-entry behavior and the entrant’s expected post-entry profit. In a classic paper,
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) assume that the incumbent has private information
about its costs of production and show that a separating equilibrium may exist
in which the incumbent limit prices and thereby signals that its costs are low.
The potential entrant then infers the incumbent’s cost type and enters exactly
when entry would be profitable under complete information. A striking impli-
cation is thus that profitable entry is not deterred. Bagwell and Ramey (1988)
extend the model to allow that the incumbent has two signals: price and advertis-
ing.2 In their model, the incumbent is privately informed as to whether its costs
are low or high, the potential entrant’s costs are commonly known, and entry is
profitable if and only if the incumbent has high costs. In the refined separating
equilibrium, the low-cost incumbent engages in a “cost-reducing distortion,” in
the sense that it adopts the same price and advertising selection as it would were
it, hypothetically, an uncontested monopoly with costs that were even lower. The
low-cost incumbent thus limit prices and distorts its demand-enhancing advertis-
ing upward. Dissipative advertising is not used. Once again, due to signaling,
profitable entry is not deterred.
As summarized above, the recent game-theoretic work does not support the
hypothesis that an incumbent can deter profitable entry by distorting its pre-
entry advertising upward. But in fact this hypothesis does find some support
in the second set of work, once pooling equilibria are considered. In particular,
for some parameter regions, Bagwell and Ramey (1988) show that refined pooling
equilibria exist in which the high-cost incumbent uses limit pricing and an upward
distortion in advertising to deter entry that would be profitable under complete
information. An important feature of their model, however, is that the incumbent
faces entry with probability one (zero) when the potential entrant’s belief that the
incumbent has high costs rises above (falls below) a threshold level. The analysis
thus leaves open whether such equilibria would exist if the potential entrant’s
2For other extensions, see Albaek and Overgaard (1992a,b), Bagwell (1992a), Bagwell and
Ramey (1990, 1991), Harrington (1986, 1987) and Linnemer (1998).
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response were “smoother,” so that higher beliefs were everywhere associated with
a greater probability of entry. A smooth response would arise, e.g., if the potential
entrant were privately informed of its fixed cost of entry.
In this paper, I follow Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Bagwell and Ramey
(1988) and posit an informational link. The analysis contributes at three levels.
First, I extend the model of Bagwell and Ramey (1988) to consider whether refined
pooling equilibria exist when the potential entrant’s response is smooth. I refer to
the associated game as the benchmark game. Following standard practice, I study
refined equilibria in the sense that I characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilbria
that satisfy the Cho-Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion. For the benchmark game,
my main finding is that intuitive pooling equilibria do not exist; thus, there exists
an unique intuitive equilibrium outcome, in which separation occurs and the low-
cost incumbent undertakes a cost-reducing distortion.3 This finding resolves an
open issue in the existing literature and thereby provides a solid foundation for
the conclusion that the recent game-theoretic literature provides little support
for the “traditional” view that advertising has an entry-deterrence eﬀect.
The second contribution is more fundamental. With the analysis of the bench-
mark game at hand, I next analyze a more general game in which the incumbent
has two dimensions of private information. Specifically, the incumbent is privately
informed as to its cost type and its level of patience, where the incumbent’s cost
type may be high or low and the incumbent’s patience level also may be high
or low. I motivate the latter dimension with reference to the corporate finance
literature, which suggests that a firm’s management may be impatient (i.e., ex-
hibit “short-termism”) if capital markets are imperfect (Shleifer and Vishney,
1990; Stein, 1989), managerial career concerns direct attention to short-term
performance measures (Narayanan, 1985) or the threat of takeover is significant
(Stein, 1988). It is plausible that the incumbent has private information about
the magnitude of such influences. The incumbent selects price and advertising
in the pre-entry period; thus, the proposed model entails both multiple signals
and multiple dimensions of private information. The potential entrant finds entry
more profitable when the incumbent has high costs, but the potential entrant’s
ability to infer the incumbent’s cost type is now confounded by the fact that the
potential entrant also lacks information as to the incumbent’s level of patience.
In the multi-dimensional model, the patient, low-cost incumbent is the strongest
type. A low-cost incumbent finds cost-reducing distortions less costly than does
a high-cost incumbent; furthermore, a patient incumbent values entry deterrence
3For related themes in models in which an incumbent uses pricing and advertising to signal
one-dimensional private information about demand, see Albaek and Overgaard (1992a) and
Bagwell and Ramey (1990).
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more than does an impatient incumbent. At the other extreme, a high-cost, im-
patient incumbent is the weakest type. The incumbent also may be an impatient,
low-cost type or a patient, high-cost type. A key insight is that an impatient, low-
cost incumbent may be unable to separate from a patient, high-cost incumbent,
since the latter discounts less the future gains associated with entry deterrence.
Several interesting findings emerge. One group of findings oﬀers support for
predictions for separating equilibria that are featured in work by Milgrom and
Roberts (1982) and Bagwell and Ramey (1988). In any intuitive equilibrium, the
patient, low-cost incumbent separates from the high-cost types, and separation is
achieved through a cost-reducing distortion. In other words, in any intuitive equi-
librium, the patient, low-cost incumbent limit prices, distorts demand-enhancing
advertising upward and does not employ dissipative advertising; in turn, this
behavior enables the potential entrant to infer the incumbent’s cost, so that prof-
itable entry is not deterred when this type of incumbent exists. Also, I identify
three kinds of intuitive equilibria, and in one kind (Kind B) the patient and im-
patient low-cost incumbent types make one selection, while the patient and im-
patient high-cost incumbent types make another selection. As in the separating
equilibria featured in the earlier models with one-dimensional private information,
equilibrium behavior is then driven entirely by diﬀerences in cost types.
At the same time, a second group of findings redirects attention to pooling
behavior and provides support for themes that are emphasized in the pre-game-
theoretic literature. In the remaining two kinds of intuitive equilibria (Kinds
A and C), the predictions of Bain (1949) and Williamson (1963) can be associ-
ated with the behavior of the patient, high-cost incumbent. In these equilibria,
the patient, high-cost incumbent pools with the impatient, low-cost incumbent.
The impatient, high-cost incumbent may also pool (Kind A) or may make its
monopoly selection and reveal itself (Kind C). Importantly, the potential en-
trant is then unable to infer the incumbent’s cost level when the pooled selection
is observed. Further, I construct intuitive equilibria in which the pooled selec-
tion entails a cost-reducing distortion by the patient, high-cost incumbent. The
patient, high-cost incumbent then limit prices and distorts upward its demand-
enhancing advertising and thereby confounds the potential entrant. As a result,
an equilibrium foundation is provided for the “traditional” hypothesis that limit
pricing and aggressive advertising by an incumbent may deter profitable entry.
Finally, the analysis generates a novel finding that is not represented in the
earlier literature. I find that intuitive equilibria (of Kind A) may exist in which
the impatient, low-cost incumbent plays “soft” in the pre-entry period, by pricing
above its monopoly level and distorting its demand-enhancing advertising down-
ward, and thus sometimes induces unprofitable entry. This occurs when all types
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other than the patient, low-cost type of incumbent pool, and the impatient, low-
cost incumbent then refrains from deviating since it does not want to induce a
less favorable belief (e.g., that it has high costs with certainty).
The third contribution of the paper is methodological. The model analyzed
here has multiple signals and two-dimensional private information. Even in this
multi-dimensional setting, I find that the Cho-Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion
has considerable force in selecting among equilibria. As well, the analysis reveals
that the existence of (pure-strategy) intuitive equilibria may be more problematic
than in standard signaling models with one-dimensional private information.
The literature on signaling games with multiple dimensions of private infor-
mation is quite undeveloped.4 Quinzii and Rochet (1985) and Engers (1987) con-
sider whether standard signaling results for models with one-dimensional private
information extend to the multi-dimensional setting. They thus develop suﬃ-
cient conditions for the existence of separating equilibria in signaling models with
multi-dimensional private information. Chen (1997) presents a model in which a
firm is privately informed as to its cost and the demand function, and the firm’s
diversification and financing decisions are possible signals of this information. He
provides conditions under which an unique separating equilibrium outcome ex-
ists. In Chen’s model, each signal is a “natural signal” for one kind of private
information, and signals are drawn from binary sets. The model developed here,
by contrast, has a diﬀerent structure and allows each signal to be drawn from the
space of non-negative real numbers. Finally, in their analysis of product-quality
signaling, Bagwell and Riordan (1991) briefly consider an extended model, in
which a monopolist is privately informed as to its quality of product and the
number of informed consumers. Consumers observe the monopolist’s price and
attempt to infer the former; however, their inferences are confounded by their
ignorance as to the latter. Bagwell and Riordan derive necessary conditions for
an intuitive equilibrium. The present paper allows for multiple signals and oﬀers
a comprehensive analysis of a related structure, in that the potential entrant lacks
information as to two variables (costs, patience) but is directly interested only in
the value of one of these variables (cost).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the general model,
define the equilibrium concept and develop useful properties. In Section 3, I ex-
amine the benchmark game in which the incumbent is privately informed only
as to its cost level. Returning to the general model with two-dimensional private
information, I characterize in Section 4 the necessary features of intuitive equilib-
4The literature on multi-dimensional screening is more advanced. Adams and Yellen (1976)
and Armstrong (1996, 1999) oﬀer important contributions, and valuable overviews of the liter-
ature are provided by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Chapter 6) and Rochet and Stole (2003).
5
ria. I find that an intuitive equilibrium must be of Kind A, B or C. In Sections 5
through 7, I then analyze the existence properties of intuitive equilibria of Kind
A, B and C, respectively. Section 8 considers the special case in which an im-
patient incumbent is completely impatient. This case is of special interest and
also serves to illustrate a non-existence result and a mixed-strategy resolution.
Section 9 concludes. Longer proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2. The Model
In this section, I define the game and equilibrium concept. Next, I introduce
some additional structure and derive some key properties. These properties are
used in subsequent sections to derive the main findings of the paper.
2.1. Game and Equilibrium Concept
Consider a market with one incumbent firm and one potential entrant. The firms
interact over two periods. In the pre-entry period, the incumbent selects a pre-
entry price, P ≥ 0, and advertising level, A ≥ 0. When the incumbent makes
these selections, it is privately informed as to its cost type, t, and its patience
level, δ, where t ∈ {L,H}, δ ∈ {λ, η},H > L > 0 and η > λ ≥ 0. The incumbent
thus has two dimensions of private information: it may have low or high costs,
and it also may have low or high patience. The potential entrant observes P and
A but not t or δ. Based on these observations, the potential entrant forms some
belief as to the incumbent’s private information and makes a decision to enter
or not. In the post-entry period, the incumbent is a monopolist if the potential
entrant chooses not to enter; however, if the potential entrant decides to enter,
then the two firms compete as duopolists.
The incumbent’s two-dimensional type, {t, δ}, is determined by Nature. For
simplicity, assume that Nature selects t = H with probability bo and δ = η with
probability βo, where t and δ are independently selected. For most of the paper,
I assume that bo ∈ (0, 1) and βo ∈ (0, 1); however, in Section 3, I assume βo = 1
and thereby examine the benchmark model in which the incumbent has private
information only about its cost type. After observing the incumbent’s pre-entry
selections, the potential entrant forms a posterior belief as to the incumbent’s
private information. Let b = b(P,A) denote the potential entrant’s posterior
belief as to the likelihood that the incumbent has a high cost type.
In the pre-entry period, the incumbent confronts a demand function, D(P,A).
I assume only that D is continuous, nonnegative, strictly decreasing in P and
weakly increasing in A. The case in which D is strictly increasing in A is the
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case of demand-enhancing advertising. The case in which D is independent of A
is the case of dissipative advertising. The pre-entry period profit function for an
incumbent with cost type t is represented as
Π(P,A | t) ≡ (P − t)D(P,A)−A.
I assume that Π(P,A | t) has a unique maximizer, (Pm(t), Am(t)), and that
Π(Pm(t), Am(t) | t) > 0.
I assume that the potential entrant’s expected profit from entry is determined
by its fixed costs of entry and the belief it holds as to the likelihood that the
incumbent has a high cost type. In particular, the expected profit from entry is
strictly increasing in the probability b that the incumbent has a high cost type. I
further assume that the potential entrant’s expected profit from entry is indepen-
dent of any belief that it may hold as to the incumbent’s level of patience. These
assumptions are appropriate, e.g., if the potential entrant learns the incumbent’s
cost type upon entering the market and post-entry competition corresponds to
the Nash equilibrium of a standard, static oligopoly game, such as the Cournot
game.5 At the same time, these assumptions are not appropriate for all forms of
post-entry competition. For instance, if the incumbent’s private information re-
mains private after the act of entry and if post-entry competition transpires over
multiple periods, then the incumbent’s post-entry play might signal its costs. The
incumbent’s play - and thus the potential entrant’s expected profit from entry -
might then depend upon the incumbent’s level of patience.
In the post-entry period, the incumbent naturally perfers no entry to entry.
Under the assumptions given in the preceding paragraph, if the potential entrant
is privately informed as to its fixed cost of entry, where the fixed cost is drawn
from an interval of possible fixed costs, then the incumbent anticipates that the
probability of entry is strictly increasing in b. Thus, when b is higher, the incum-
bent is expected to earn less in the post-entry period, since it is then more likely
to receive duopoly rather than monopoly profit. It is thus possible to capture the
entrant’s behavior in a general way by assuming simply that the incumbent’s ex-
pected post-entry profit is strictly decreasing in b. In particular, let eπt(b) denote
the expected post-entry profit for an incumbent with cost type t and assume for
simplicity that eπt(b) is diﬀerentiable. I assume that eπt(b) > 0 > eπ0t(b).
Consider now the discounted payoﬀ over the game for an incumbent with cost
type t and patience level δ, when the incumbent makes pre-entry selections P
5Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and most subsequent analyses also assume that the incumbent’s
private cost information becomes public upon the act of entry. When firms adopt the Nash
strategies for a static oligopoly game, the incumbent’s post-entry play is independent of its
discount factor; thus, it is then unimportant whether the incumbent’s patience level remains
private information after entry.
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and A and thus induces the belief b = b(P,A). This payoﬀ is given as
Π(P,A | t) + δeπt(b),
where t ∈ {L,H} and δ ∈ {λ, η}.
The next task is to define a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). The triplet
{P (t, δ), A(t, δ), b(P,A)} forms an equilibrium if and only if
(E1). For all t ∈ {L,H} and δ ∈ {λ, η},
(P (t, δ), A(t, δ)) ∈ argmax{Π(P,A | t) + δeπt(b(P,A))}, and
(E2). Whenever possible, b(P,A) is consistent with Bayes’ rule.6
Thus, whatever its two-dimensional type, the incumbent selects its price and
advertising levels as a best response to the potential entrant’s belief function.
In turn, the potential entrant’s beliefs must be derived by application of Bayes’
rule for price and advertising selections that are on the equilibrium path. For
selections that fall oﬀ the equilibrium path (i.e., for (P,A) /∈ {P (t, δ), A(t, δ)}),
however, no restriction is placed on the potential entrant’s beliefs. As in familiar
one-dimensional signaling models, this freedom in specifying oﬀ-equilibrium-path
beliefs is a source of multiple equilibria.
For signaling models with one-dimensional private information, it is standard
practice to follow Cho and Kreps (1987) and place structure on oﬀ-equilibrium-
path beliefs with the requirement that players never believe that “equilibrium-
dominated” strategies are selected. A similar practice can be followed in the
present setting with two dimensions of private information. To formalize this
requirement, fix a particular equilibrium satisfying (E1) and (E2). Let bΠ(t, δ)
denote the equilibrium discounted game payoﬀ for an incumbent with the two-
dimensional type (t, δ). Formally, this value is defined by
bΠ(t, δ) ≡ Π(P (t, δ), A(t, δ) | t) + δeπt(btδ),
where btδ ≡ b(P (t, δ), A(t, δ)). Consider now a deviant selection, (P,A), where
(P,A) 6= (P (t, δ), A(t, δ)) for any t and δ. This deviation is equilibrium dominated
for an incumbent with type (t, δ) if and only if
Π(P,A | t) + δeπt(0) < bΠ(t, δ).
6Formally, the definition of a PBE should also include the requirement that the potential
entrant’s belief as to the incumbent’s level of patience is formed in a manner that is consistent
with Bayes’ rule. Under the assumptions adopted above, however, the potential entrant’s ex-
pected profit from entry is independent of any belief it holds with regard to the incumbent’s
level of patience, and so this belief may be ignored without loss of generality.
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Intuitively, an incumbent with type (t, δ) would never select (P,A), if in the best
case (b = 0) the deviant selection oﬀers the incumbent a lower payoﬀ than it
could obtain by following the equilibrium (i.e., by selecting (P (t, δ), A(t, δ))).
An intuitive equilibrium is now defined as a triplet {P (t, δ), A(t, δ), b(P,A)}
that satisfies (E1), (E2) and
(E3). If (P,A) is equilibrium dominated for (H,λ) and (H, η) but not for (L,λ)
or (L, η), then b(P,A) = 0. If (P,A) is equilibrium dominated for (L,λ) and
(L, η) but not for (H,λ) or (H, η), then b(P,A) = 1.
Thus, in an intuitive equilibrium, if a deviation is equilibrium dominated for an
incumbent of one cost type whatever that incumbent’s level of patience and if the
deviation is not equilibrium dominated for an incumbent with the other cost type
for at least one level of patience, then the potential entrant must believe that the
incumbent has the latter cost type.
2.2. Additional Structure and Key Properties
As shown by Bagwell and Ramey (1988), signaling models with multiple signals
often can be easily analyzed once an extended profit function is defined.7 I extend
here this approach to a setting with multiple dimensions of private information.
The extended profit function is defined as
Π(P,A | c) ≡ (P − c)D(P,A)−A,
where c is drawn from the set of positive real numbers. Thus, even though the
incumbent’s cost type is either t = L or t = H, it is still possible to extend the
definition of the incumbent’s pre-entry profit function to cover the hypothetical
case in which the incumbent has an arbitrary cost level, c. Next, I assume that
Π(P,A | c) has a unique maximizer, ψ(c), which is continuous and defined as
ψ(c) ≡ (P (c), A(c)) = argmax{Π(P,A | c)}.
Observe that ψ(H) = (Pm(H), Am(H)) and ψ(L) = (Pm(L), Am(L)). Thus, ψ(c)
gives the monopoly price and advertising selections for a firm with cost level c.
Given that D is strictly decreasing in P and that Π(P,A | c) has a unique max-
imizer, it is straightforward to confirm that P (c) is strictly increasing. I assume
that A(c) is strictly decreasing in the case of demand-enhancing advertising. In
the case of dissipative advertising, A(c) is constant at zero.
7See also Albaek and Overgaard (1992a,b), Bagwell (1992b), Bagwell and Ramey (1990),
Overgaard (1991) and Ramey (1996).
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The extended profit function satisfies a simple ranking property. Fix any
(P1, A1) and (P2, A2), where (P1, A1) 6= (P2, A2). Define
∆(c) ≡ Π(P2, A2 | c)−Π(P1, A1 | c),
and observe that ∆(c) is diﬀerentiable and indeed linear in c. In particular, it is
immediate that ∆0(c) = D(P1, A1) − D(P2, A2). It is now convenient to record
the following ranking property.
Lemma 2.1. Fix any (P1, A1) and (P2, A2), where (P1, A1) 6= (P2, A2). Then
∆0(c) = D(P1, A1)−D(P2, A2), and so ∆(c) is either constant, strictly increasing
or strictly decreasing in c.
To see how Lemma 2.1 might be used, suppose it were known that ∆(H) = 0 <
∆(c) for some c < H. In this situation, a high-cost incumbent’s pre-entry profit is
the same whether (P1, A1) or (P2, A2) is selected; however, a hypothetical incum-
bent with cost c < H enjoys higher pre-entry profit under the latter selection.
Lemma 2.1 then guarantees that ∆(c) is strictly decreasing, and this in turn
ensures that ∆(L) > 0. In this way, Lemma 2.1 points to a single-dimensional
ranking statistic, c, for comparisons that involve multiple signals.
The ranking property yields a valuable monotonicity property.
Lemma 2.2. Fix t ∈ {L,H}. Then Π(ψ(c) | t) is continuous in c, strictly de-
creases in c for c > t, and strictly increases in c for c < t.
Proof: Continuity is immediate, since Π is continuous in P and A while ψ(c) is
continuous in c. To establish monotonicity, pick c2 > c1. Let (P2, A2) = ψ(c2)
and (P1, A1) = ψ(c1). Then ∆(c2) > 0 > ∆(c1), and so ∆(c) is strictly increasing
by Lemma 2.1. Thus, if c2 > c1 > t, then ∆(t) = Π(ψ(c2) | t)−Π(ψ(c1) | t) < 0.
Likewise, if t > c2 > c1, then ∆(t) = Π(ψ(c2) | t)−Π(ψ(c1) | t) > 0.
I now add some additional structure to the model with the following three
maintained assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Boundary Conditions)
(i) There exists c < H such that Π(ψ(c) | H)+ηeπH(0) < Π(ψ(H) | H)+ηeπH(1).
(ii) There exists c > H such that Π(ψ(c) | H)+ηeπH(0) < Π(ψ(H) | H)+ηeπH(1).
Assumption 2 (The Value of Deterrence and Cost Types)
d
db [eπL(b)− eπH(b)] ≤ 0.
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Assumption 3 (Distortion Required)
Π(ψ(L) | H) + ηeπH(0) > Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(1).
Assumption 1 is a technical condition, the role of which is clarified below. As-
sumption 2 indicates that the benefit of a lower belief is weakly greater for an
incumbent with low costs than an incumbent with high costs. Finally, Assump-
tion 3 indicates that a patient, high-cost incumbent would rather mimic the low-
cost monopoly selection and be perceived to have low costs than to make the
high-cost monopoly selection and be recognized as a high-cost incumbent. Un-
der this assumption, in any equilibrium in which the high-cost incumbent makes
its monopoly selection and is revealed to have high costs, the low-cost incumbent
must distort its selection away from its monopoly selection. All three assumptions
are standard; e.g., Bagwell and Ramey (1988) impose analogous assumptions.
Together, the ranking property in Lemma 2.1 and Assumption 2 suggest the
possibility of a “single-crossing property” for payoﬀs in the two-period game.
The following lemmas oﬀer diﬀerent expressions of this idea. Both lemmas are
established for any δ ∈ {λ, η}.
Lemma 2.3. Consider any (P1, A1, b1) and (P2, A2, b2) and c < H such that
Π(P2, A2 | c) + δeπH(b2) > Π(P1, A1 | c) + δeπH(b1), and
Π(P2, A2 | H) + δeπH(b2) = Π(P1, A1 | H) + δeπH(b1).
If b2 ≤ b1, then
Π(P2, A2 | L) + δeπL(b2) > Π(P1, A1 | L) + δeπL(b1).
Proof: Under the given assumptions, ∆(c) > δ[eπH(b1)− eπH(b2)] = ∆(H); thus,
by Lemma 2.1 ∆(c) is strictly decreasing. Hence, ∆(L) > ∆(H) = δ[eπH(b1) −eπH(b2)] ≥ δ[eπL(b1)− eπL(b2)], where the final inequality follows from Assumption
2 and b2 ≤ b1. Thus, ∆(L) > δ[eπL(b1)− eπL(b2)].
According to Lemma 2.3, if an incumbent with a high cost type is indiﬀerent
between (P1, A1, b1) and (P2, A2, b2) where b2 ≤ b1, and yet the incumbent would
prefer the latter option were its cost level at some lower level c, then the incumbent
must also prefer the latter option when its cost type is low.
The second lemma captures a related implication.
Lemma 2.4. Consider any (P1, A1, b1) and (P2, A2, b2) and c < L such that
Π(P2, A2 | c) + δeπH(b2) ≥ Π(P1, A1 | c) + δeπH(b1), and
Π(P2, A2 | H) + δeπH(b2) ≥ Π(P1, A1 | H) + δeπH(b1),
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with at least one inequality strict. If b2 ≤ b1, then
Π(P2, A2 | L) + δeπL(b2) > Π(P1, A1 | L) + δeπL(b1).
Proof: Under the given assumptions, ∆(c) ≥ δ[eπH(b1) − eπH(b2)] and ∆(H) ≥
δ[eπH(b1) − eπH(b2)], with at least one inequality strict; thus, using Lemma 2.1
and L ∈ (c,H), it follows that ∆(L) > δ[eπH(b1)− eπH(b2)] ≥ δ[eπL(b1)− eπL(b2)],
where the final inequality follows from Assumption 2 and b2 ≤ b1. Thus, ∆(L) >
δ[eπL(b1)− eπL(b2)].
Lemma 2.4 allows that the incumbent with a high cost type prefers the triplet
(P2, A2, b2) to the triplet (P1, A1, b1) where b2 ≤ b1; however, this lemma requires
that the fictitious cost level c lies strictly below L.
I conclude this section by establishing some properties of the iso-payoﬀ curve
for a patient incumbent with a high cost type. In particular, suppose that a
patient, high-cost incumbent selects a pair (P,A) and that this selection “fools”
the potential entrant and induces the belief that the incumbent has the low cost
type. When would such selections yield the same payoﬀ for the patient, high-
cost incumbent as it would make were it instead to make its monopoly selection,
ψ(H), and induce the (correct) belief that it has the high cost type? This question
motivates consideration of the iso-payoﬀ curve defined by
Π(P,A | H) + ηeπH(0) = Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(1).
Using Assumptions 1 and 3, it is evident that
Π(ψ(c) | H) + ηeπH(0) < Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(1) < Π(ψ(L) | H) + ηeπH(0).
Thus, by Lemma 2.2, there exists a unique cost level co ∈ (c, L) such that
Π(ψ(co) | H) + ηeπH(0) = Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(1). (2.1)
Likewise, Assumption 1 and eπ0H(b) < 0 also imply that
Π(ψ(c) | H) + ηeπH(0) < Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(1) < Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(0).
Thus, by Lemma 2.2, there exists a unique cost level coo ∈ (H, c) such that
Π(ψ(coo) | H) + ηeπH(0) = Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(1). (2.2)
The iso-payoﬀ curve and associated values co and coo are depicted in Figure 1.
Using (2.1) and (2.2), it is now possible to oﬀer a first characterization of
equilibrium behavior.
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Lemma 2.5. In any equilibrium, there exists an unique cost level ce ∈ [co,H)
and an unique cost level cee ∈ (H, coo] such thatbΠ(H, η) = Π(ψ(ce) | H) + ηeπH(0) = Π(ψ(cee) | H) + ηeπH(0).
Proof: Fix any equilibrium. Consider an incumbent with the two-dimensinal
type (H, η). This incumbent must weakly prefer its equilibrium selection to the
option of selecting its monopoly selection, ψ(H). Thus, bΠ(H, η) ≥ Π(ψ(H) |
H) + ηeπH(b(ψ(H))) ≥ Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(1) = Π(ψ(co) | H) + ηeπH(0) =
Π(ψ(coo) | H)+ ηeπH(0). Of course, this incumbent’s payoﬀ is maximized when it
makes its monopoly selection and yet induces the belief b = 0. In any equilibrium,
however, (E2) ensures that bHη > 0. Thus, Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(0) > bΠ(H, η).
The proof is now completed through the application of Lemma 2.2.
Figure 1 also illustrates possible values for ce and cee. Notice that ce > L is
possible, even under Assumption 3, if bΠ(H, η) exceeds Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(1) to
a suﬃcient degree.
3. Benchmark: One-Dimensional Private Information
In this section, I consider a benchmark model in which the incumbent’s patience
level is public information. Thus, in the benchmark model, the incumbent’s pre-
entry selections signal only its cost type, t. A characterization of the intuitive
equilibria of the benchmark model is useful, since it is then possible to identify
those predictions in the model with two dimensions of private information that
are attributable to the extra dimension of hidden information.
The benchmark model can be analyzed with minor modifications of the struc-
ture presented above. In particular, suppose now that βo = 1, so that the incum-
bent is known to have the patience level δ ≡ η.With this modification in mind, I
may represent the incumbent’s strategy as (P (t, η), A(t, η)). The definition of an
equilibrium is unaltered, with the understanding that (E1) is now required only
when δ ≡ η. For the benchmark model, a deviation is equilibrium dominated for
an incumbent of type t if and only if Π(P,A | t) + ηeπt(0) < bΠ(t, η). Finally, an
intuitive equilibrium is defined as before, once we modify (E3) in the following
fashion: If (P,A) is equilibrium dominated for t = H but not for t = L, then
b(P,A) = 0; likewise, if (P,A) is equilibrium dominated for t = L but not for
t = H, then b(P,A) = 1. The additional structure and key properties developed
above apply to the benchmark model without further modification.
It is convenient now to distinguish between the two kinds of equilibria that
are possible in the benchmark game. For the benchmark game, a separating equi-
librium occurs if (P (H, η), A(H, η)) 6= (P (L, η), A(L, η)). In such an equilibrium,
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the potential entrant can infer the incumbent’s cost type, and so (E2) requires
that b(P (H, η), A(H, η)) = 1 > 0 = b(P (L, η), A(L, η)). By contrast, in a pooling
equilibrium of the benchmark game, (P (H, η), A(H, η)) = (P (L, η), A(L, η)) and
then (E2) requires that b(P (H, η), A(H, η)) = bo.
I begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. In any separating equilibrium of the benchmark game, (P (H, η), A(H, η)) =
ψ(H).
Proof: Assume to the contrary that a separating equilibrium exists in which
(P (H, η), A(H, η)) 6= ψ(H). Then under (E2) b(P (H, η), A(H, η)) = 1, and sobΠ(H, η) = Π(P (H, η), A(H, η) | H) + ηeπH(1) < Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(1) ≤
Π(ψ(H) | H)+ ηeπH(b(ψ(H))). Thus, (E1) fails: the incumbent with cost type H
would gain by deviating to ψ(H).
Intuitively, in a separating equilibrium of the benchmark model, the incumbent
with the high cost type is “found out” and faces the maximum probability of
entry. If (P (H, η), A(H, η)) 6= ψ(H), then this incumbent would deviate to ψ(H),
as it then gains in the pre-entry period and does no worse in the post-entry period.
I next characterize the set of intuitive separating equilibria.
Proposition 3.2. In the benchmark game, there exists at most one intuitive
separating equilibrium outcome, and in it (P (L, η), A(L, η)) = ψ(co), where co <
L is defined by (2.1).
Proof: The existence of co < L is established above in (2.1). Consider now the
following program: max
P,A
Π(P,A | L)+ ηeπL(0) subject to Π(P,A | H)+ ηeπH(0) ≤
Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(1). The claim is that ψ(co) is the unique solution to this
program. Observe that ψ(co) ≡ (P2, A2) satisfies the program’s constraint. Pick
any (P1, A1) 6= ψ(co) that also satisfies this constraint. Note that ∆(co) > 0;
further, ∆(H) ≥ 0, since Π(ψ(co) | H)+ηeπH(0) = Π(ψ(H) | H)+ηeπH(1). Given
co < L, Lemma 2.4 may be applied (with b1 = b2 = 0) to yield ∆(L) > 0, and the
claim is established. Now, assume to the contrary that (P (L, η), A(L, η)) 6= ψ(co)
in an intuitive separating equilibrium of the benchmark model. By Lemma 3.1,bΠ(H, η) = Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(1); thus, (E1) is satisfied when t = H only
if (P (L, η), A(L, η)) satisfies the constraint of the program just analyzed. The
established claim thus implies that Π(ψ(co) | L) + ηeπL(0) > Π(P (L, η), A(L, η) |
L) + ηeπL(0). Consider a deviation, ψ(co − ε), where ε > 0 is small. Clearly,
this deviation is not equilibrium dominated for type t = L. But, by Lemma
2.2, the deviation is equilibrium dominated for type t = H. Thus, under (E3),
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b(ψ(co − ε)) = 0. But then the incumbent with cost type L would deviate, and a
contradiction is thus established.
As confirmed in the proof of this proposition, in any intuitive separating equilib-
rium for the benchmark model, the “least-cost” separating equilibrium is charac-
terized by (P (L, η), A(L, η)) = ψ(co) and must obtain.
I now consider the existence of an intuitive separating equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3. In the benchmark game, there exists an unique intuitive sep-
arating equilibrium outcome.
Proof: Let (P (H, η), A(H, η)) = ψ(H) and (P (L, η), A(L, η)) = ψ(co) and set
b(ψ(H)) = 1 > 0 = b(ψ(co)). I first derive a key inequality for the payoﬀ of t = L.
Let (P1, A1, b1) = (ψ(L), 1) and (P2, A2, b2) = (ψ(co), 0). By construction, type
H is indiﬀerent between (P2, A2, b2) and (ψ(H), 1); consequently, type H strictly
prefers (P2, A2, b2) to (P1, A1, b1). Also, if the incumbent’s cost level were co, then
it would strictly prefer (P2, A2, b2) to (P1, A1, b1) . Since b2 < b1 and co < L, it
thus follows from Lemma 2.4 that Π(ψ(co) | L)+ηeπL(0) > Π(ψ(L) | L)+ηeπL(1).
The second step is to specify beliefs when deviations are observed. For (P,A) /∈
{ψ(co),ψ(H)}, beliefs are specified as follows: if Π(P,A | H)+ηeπH(0) < Π(ψ(H) |
H) + ηeπH(1), then b(P,A) = 0; and if Π(P,A | H) + ηeπH(0) ≥ Π(ψ(H) | H) +
ηeπH(1), then b(P,A) = 1. Notice that, since bΠ(H, η) = Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(1),
(P,A) in the first set are equilibrium dominated for t = H while (P,A) in the
second set are not equilibrium dominated for t = H. The third step is to verify that
(E1)-(E3) are satisfied. Given the belief specification, it is immediate that (E1)
is satisfied for t = H. (E1) is also satisfied for t = L : the best deviation over the
range for which b(P,A) = 1 is ψ(L), and the first step above establishes that this
deviation strictly lowers the payoﬀ for t = L; furthermore, as shown in the proof
of Proposition 3.2, the equilibrium selection, ψ(co), uniquely maximizes the payoﬀ
for t = L over the range for which b(P,A) = 0. (E2) is clearly satisfied. Finally,
(E3) is sure to hold, since b(P,A) = 0 when (P,A) is equilibrium dominated for
t = H, and b(P,A) = 1 when (P,A) is not equilibrium dominated for t = H.
The final task is to consider the possibility of intuitive pooling equilibria.
Proposition 3.4. In the benchmark game, there does not exist an intuitive pool-
ing equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose a pooling equilibrium exists in the benchmark game, and let
(Pp, Ap) ≡ (P (H, η), A(H, η)) = (P (L, η), A(L, η)). By (E2), b(Pp, Ap) = bo, and
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so bΠ(H, η) = Π(Pp, Ap | H) + ηeπH(bo). By Lemma 2.5, there exists a unique
cost level ce ∈ [co,H) such that Π(ψ(ce) | H) + ηeπH(0) = bΠ(H, η). Now, let
(P1, A1, b1) = (Pp, Ap, bo) and (P2, A2, b2) = (ψ(ce), 0). By construction, type
H is indiﬀerent between the two options. Also, if the incumbent’s type were
ce, then it would strictly prefer (P2, A2, b2) to (P1, A1, b1). Since ce < H and
b2 < b1, it follows from Lemma 2.3 that type L strictly prefers (P2, A2, b2) to
(P1, A1, b1), or equivalently, Π(ψ(ce) | L) + δeπL(0) > Π(Pp, Ap | L) + δeπL(bo).
Now consider a deviation, ψ(ce− ε), where ε > 0 is small. Clearly, this deviation
is not equilibrium dominated for type t = L. Given ce < H, it follows from
Lemma 2.2 that the deviation is equilibrium dominated for type t = H. Thus,
under (E3), b(ψ(ce − ε)) = 0. But then (E1) fails, since the incumbent with cost
type L would deviate to ψ(ce − ε). This establishes that no intuitive pooling
equilibrium exists.
The following corollary summarizes the findings reported above.
Corollary 3.5. In the benchmark game, there exists an unique intuitive equi-
librium outcome, and in it (P (H, η), A(H, η)) = ψ(H) and (P (L, η), A(L, η)) =
ψ(co), where co < L is defined by (2.1).
In eﬀect, the low-cost incumbent engages in a “cost-reducing” distortion. It
acts as if its costs were lower than they truly are and then simply selects the corre-
sponding monopoly selection. The low-cost incumbent thus limit prices: P (co) <
P (L) ≡ Pm(L). Moreover, when advertising is demand enhancing, the low-cost
incumbent also distorts upward its level of advertising: A(co) > A(L) ≡ Am(L).
On the other hand, when advertising is dissipative, the monopoly level of adver-
tising is zero, and so the low-cost incumbent does not use dissipative advertising:
A(co) = 0 = A(L) ≡ Am(L). With these selections, the low-cost incumbent
achieves separation and thus deters entry to the maximal extent possible. Notice,
though, that limit pricing and upward distortions in demand-enhancing advertis-
ing do not deter profitable entry; instead, the signaling behavior of the low-cost
incumbent enables the potential entrant to accurately infer the incumbent’s cost
level, so that entry can occur exactly when it is profitable.
The analysis presented in the section captures the central theme of the classic
limit pricing paper by Milgrom and Roberts (1982), in that limit pricing occurs
and yet profitable entry is never deterred. The analysis presented here goes fur-
ther, however, and characterizes the “refined” equilibrium outcome for a model in
which both pre-entry pricing and advertising may serve as signals. Bagwell and
Ramey (1988) present a related model. The main diﬀerence between that paper
and the present eﬀort is that post-entry incumbent profit is modeled here as a
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smooth function of the potential entrant’s beliefs, whereas Bagwell and Ramey
(1988) assume the probability of entry jumps from zero to one once the belief
rises above a critical value. Their formulation derives from a model in which the
potential entrant’s fixed cost of entry takes a single value and is public informa-
tion. As they show, intuitive pooling equilibria then may exist. The approach
adopted in the present paper has the virtue of capturing the realistic possibility
that the incumbent is uninformed as to the potential entrant’s fixed cost of entry
and thus always has some uncertainty as to whether entry is profitable. In this
“smoother” formulation, intuitive pooling equilibria fail to exist, and the focal
outcome is thus the unique intuitive separating equilibrium outcome.
4. Intuitive Equilibria: Necessary Properties
With the benchmark model now analyzed, I return to the general model with
two dimensions of private information. This model is fully described in Section
2, under the assumption that βo ∈ (0, 1). I maintain this assumption henceforth.
In the present section, I derive necessary properties of intuitive equilibria. These
properties direct attention to the possible kinds of intuitive equilibrium behavior,
and the corresponding equilibria are constructed in the next section.
4.1. The Patient, Low-Cost incumbent
I focus first on the behavior of the patient, low-cost incumbent (i.e., the incumbent
of type (L, η)). I show that the intuitive criterion has significant power even in
the model with two-dimensional private information and, indeed, that the patient,
low-cost incumbent’s behavior is similar to that which is predicted in the intuitive
equilibrium of the benchmark model for the low-cost incumbent. Thus, in a
broad sense, the predictions of the earlier literature (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982;
Bagwell and Ramey, 1988) carry over to the setting with two dimensions of private
information, with regard to the behavior of the patient, low-cost incumbent.
This broad point is developed through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 4.1. In any intuitive equilibrium, (P (L, η), A(L, η)) 6= (P (H, η), A(H, η)).
Proof: Assume to the contrary that (P (L, η), A(L, η)) = (P (H, η), A(H, η)) in
an intuitive equilibrium. Let bHη ∈ (0, 1) denote the corresponding belief. Using
Lemma 2.5, there exists a unique cost level ce ∈ [co,H) such that bΠ(H, η) ≡
Π(P (H, η), A(H, η) | H)+ ηeπH(bHη) = Π(ψ(ce) | H)+ ηeπH(0). Thus, type (H, η)
is indiﬀerent between (P1, A1, b1) ≡ (P (H, η), A(H, η), bHη) and (P2, A2, b2) ≡
(ψ(ce), 0). Further, an incumbent with cost level ce strictly prefers the latter
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option. Given that b2 = 0 < b1 = bHη and ce < H, Lemma 2.3 now ensures
that type (L, η) strictly prefers the latter option: bΠ(L, η) ≡ Π(P (H, η), A(H, η) |
L) + ηeπL(bHη) < Π(ψ(ce) | L) + ηeπL(0). Finally, consider type (H,λ). This
type weakly prefers its equilibrium selection to (P1, A1, b1) and strictly prefers
(P1, A1, b1) to (P2, A2, b2), since
bΠ(H,λ) ≥ Π(P (H, η), A(H, η) | H) + λeπH(bHη)
= Π(ψ(ce) | H) + λeπH(0) + (η − λ)(eπH(0)− eπH(bHη))
> Π(ψ(ce) | H) + λeπH(0).
By Lemma 2.2, for ε > 0 and suﬃciently small, ψ(ce−ε) is equilibrium dominated
for (H, η) and (H,λ) but not for (L, η). Under (E3), b(ψ(ce − ε)) = 0. But then
type (L, η) would deviate to ψ(ce − ε). A contradiction is thus obtained.
Intuitively, the two-dimensional type (L, η) is the “strong, strong” type, since
it both has low costs and discounts less the benefit from entry deterrence. If
this type were to pool with type (H, η), then it thus would be able to utilize the
intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) and find attractive deviations that
are equilibrium dominated for types (H, η) and (H,λ).
I show next that type (L, η) is also unwilling to pool with type (H,λ).
Lemma 4.2. In any intuitive equilibrium, (P (L, η), A(L, η)) 6= (P (H,λ), A(H,λ)).
Proof: Assume to the contrary that (P (L, η), A(L, η)) = (P (H,λ), A(H,λ)) in
an intuitive equilibrium. By Lemma 4.1, (P (L, η), A(L, η)) 6= (P (H, η), A(H, η)).
A first observation is that bHη ≤ bLη = bHλ is necessary. To see this, note that
the following equilibrium conditions must hold for types (H, η) and (H,λ) :
Π(P (H, η), A(H, η) | H) + ηeπH(bHη) ≥ Π(P (L, η), A(L, η) | H) + ηeπH(bLη)
Π(P (L, η), A(L, η) | H) + λeπH(bLη) ≥ Π(P (H, η), A(H, η) | H) + λeπH(bHη).
Adding yields [η − λ][eπH(bHη) − eπH(bLη)] ≥ 0, and so the first observation now
follows. A second observation is that (P (H, η), A(H, η)) = (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) is
also necessary. Otherwise, bHη = 1 > bLη, which contradicts the first observation.
A third observation is that bHη = bLλ = bLη = bHλ is then necessary. To see this,
consider the equilibrium conditions for types (L, η) and (L,λ) :
Π(P (L, η), A(L, η) | L) + ηeπL(bLη) ≥ Π(P (H, η), A(H, η) | L) + ηeπL(bHη)
Π(P (H, η), A(H, η) | L) + λeπL(bHη) ≥ Π(P (L, η), A(L, η) | L) + λeπL(bLη).
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Adding yields [η − λ][eπL(bLη) − eπL(bHη)] ≥ 0, and so bLη = bHλ ≤ bHη = bLλ.
But the first two observations establish the opposite weak inequality; thus, the
third observation follows.8 Fourth, it follows from the third observation that, for
all δ and t, δeπt(bHη) = δeπt(bLη); thus, the equilibrium conditions set out above
must bind and Π(P (H, η), A(H, η) | t) = Π(P (L, η), A(L, η) | t).
By Lemma 2.5, there exists ce ∈ [co,H) such that bΠ(H, η) = Π(ψ(ce) | H) +
ηeπH(0). Thus, type (H, η) is indiﬀerent between (P1, A1, b1) ≡ (P (H, η), A(H, η), bHη)
and (P2, A2, b2) ≡ (ψ(ce), 0). An incumbent with cost level ce strictly prefers the
latter option. Given that b2 = 0 < b1 = bHη and ce < H, Lemma 2.3 now ensures
that type (L, η) strictly prefers the latter option. Using the fourth observation
above and this strict preference, it thus follows that
bΠ(L, η) ≡ Π(P (L, η), A(L, η) | L) + ηeπL(bLη)
= Π(P (H, η), A(H, η) | L) + ηeπL(bHη)
< Π(ψ(ce) | L) + ηeπL(0).
Finally, consider type (H,λ). Using the fourth observation above, this type is
indiﬀerent between its equilibrium selection and (P1, A1, b1) and strictly prefers
(P1, A1, b1) to (P2, A2, b2), since
bΠ(H,λ) = Π(P (H, η), A(H, η) | H) + λeπH(bHη)
= Π(ψ(ce) | H) + λeπH(0) + (η − λ)(eπH(0)− eπH(bHη))
> Π(ψ(ce) | H) + λeπH(0).
By Lemma 2.2, for ε > 0 and suﬃciently small, ψ(ce−ε) is equilibrium dominated
for (H, η) and (H,λ) but not for (L, η). Under (E3), b(ψ(ce − ε)) = 0. But then
type (L, η) would deviate to ψ(ce − ε). A contradiction is thus obtained.
The proof of Lemma 4.2 is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.1, once it is established
that type (L, η) earns the same payoﬀ by following its equilibrium strategies
as it would by following those of type (H, η). This payoﬀ relationship follows
immediately in the proof of Lemma 4.1, since it is posited there that these types
pool. In the proof of Lemma 4.2, the hypothesis is instead that types (L, η)
and (H,λ) pool, and the payoﬀ relationship is established through a series of
observations about the consequent equilibrium behavior.
Together, Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 establish that, in any intuitive equilibrium, the
patient, low-cost incumbent must separate from both the patient and impatient
8 It is now evident that such an equilibrium is possible only for a non-generic specification of
prior probabilities, bo and βo.
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high-cost incumbents. It remains possible that the patient, low-cost incumbent
pools with the impatient, low-cost incumbent. In any event, an immediate impli-
cation of the two lemmas is that the potential entrant infers that the incumbent
has low costs, upon observing the pre-entry selection of the patient, low-cost
incumbent; that is, in any intuitive equilibrium, bLη = 0.
Given that the patient, low-cost incumbent must separate from the patient
and impatient high-cost incumbents in any intuitive equilibrium, the next step is
to determine the pre-entry selections that the patient, low-cost incumbent must
make. The following lemma contains an important initial finding.
Lemma 4.3. In any intuitive equilibrium, ce < L, where ce is defined in Lemma
2.5.
Proof: Fix an intuitive equilibrium. First, assume to the contrary that ce > L.
From Lemma 2.5, it then follows that ce ∈ (L,H) satisfiesbΠ(H, η) = Π(ψ(ce) | H) + ηeπH(0)
> Π(ψ(L) | H) + ηeπH(0),
where the inequality follows from Lemma 2.2. Thus, ψ(L) is equilibrium domi-
nated for type (H, η). Consider type (H,λ). Observe thatbΠ(H,λ) ≥ Π(P (H, η), A(H, η) | H) + λeπH(bHη)
> Π(P (H, η), A(H, η) | H) + λeπH(bHη) + (η − λ)[eπH(bHη)− eπH(0)]
> Π(ψ(L) | H) + λeπH(0),
where the first inequality follows from (E1), the second inequality arises since
bHη > 0 under (E2), and the third inequality is simply a restatement of the
inequality just derived for bΠ(H, η). Thus, ψ(L) is also equilibrium dominated
for type (H,λ). Of course, ψ(L) is not equilibrium dominated for type (L, η).
Hence, under (E3), if (P (L, η), A(L, η)) 6= ψ(L), then b(ψ(L)) = 0, and type
(L, η) would thus deviate to ψ(L). Thus, an intuitive equilibrium is possible only
if (P (L, η), A(L, η)) = ψ(L) and hence b(ψ(L)) = 0. But in this case type (L,λ)
would also select ψ(L), and thus it is necessary that bHη = bHλ = 1. Given these
beliefs, (E1) can hold for types (H, η) and (H,λ) only if (P (H, η), A(H, η)) =
(P (H,λ), A(H,λ)) = ψ(H). But this specification cannot hold under Assumption
3, since type (H, η) would deviate from ψ(H) to ψ(L) and enjoy thereby the belief
b(ψ(L)) = 0 rather than b(ψ(H)) = 1. A contradiction is thus obtained.
Second, assume to the contrary that ce = L. If (P (L, η), A(L, η)) = ψ(L), then
as before type (L,λ) would also select ψ(L). Once again, it then would be neces-
sary that bHη = bHλ = 1 and thus that both types of the high-cost incumbent se-
lect ψ(H), and under Assumption 3 a contradiction would emerge. Suppose then
20
that ce = L and (P (L, η), A(L, η)) 6= ψ(L).When ce = L, it is straightforward to
modify the inequalities set oﬀ above and confirm that bΠ(H, η) = Π(ψ(L) | H) +
ηeπH(0) and bΠ(H,λ) > Π(ψ(L) | H) + λeπH(0). Given (P (L, η), A(L, η)) 6= ψ(L),
it follows that bΠ(L, η) < Π(ψ(L) | L) + ηeπL(0). Thus, for ε > 0 and suﬃciently
small, Lemma 2.2 implies that ψ(L−ε) is equilibrium dominated for types (H, η)
and (H,λ) but not for type (L, η); hence, under (E3), b(ψ(L− ε)) = 0. But then
type (L, η) would deviate to ψ(L−ε), and so a contradiction is again obtained.
This lemma indicates that, in intuitive equilibria, there is a limit as to the payoﬀ
that a patient, high-cost incumbent can enjoy (perhaps while pooling with an
impatient, low-cost incumbent). As shown in the proof, if the patient, high-cost
incumbent earns too much, in the sense that ce ≥ L, then the only possible
intuitive equilibria entail the patient, low-cost incumbent making its monopoly
selection, ψ(L). The impatient, low-cost incumbent would then also make this
selection, in order to enjoy monopoly profit in the pre-entry period along with
the belief bLη = 0. But then the high-cost incumbent types would be revealed and
thus could do no better than to select their own monopoly selection, ψ(H). At
this stage a contradiction emerges, since under Assumption 3 a patient high-cost
incumbent would mimic ψ(L).
It is now possible to precisely describe the pre-entry selection that the patient,
low-cost incumbent must make in an intuitive equilibrium.
Proposition 4.4. In any intuitive equilibrium, bLη = 0, ce < L and (P (L, η), A(L, η)) =
ψ(ce), where ce is defined in Lemma 2.5.
Proof: Fix an intuitive equilibrium. As noted above, Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 imply
that bLη = 0. Lemma 4.3 establishes that ce < L. Thus, the remaining step is to
show that (P (L, η), A(L, η)) = ψ(ce).
First, suppose to the contrary that (P (L, η), A(L, η)) ≡ (P1, A1) such that
(P1, A1) 6= ψ(ce) and Π(P1, A1 | H)+ ηeπH(0) = bΠ(H, η). Define ψ(ce) ≡ (P2, A2)
and recall from Lemma 2.5 that bΠ(H, η) = Π(ψ(ce) | H) + ηeπH(0). Thus, type
(H, η) is indiﬀerent between (P1, A1, b1 = 0) and (P2, A2, b2 = 0). Clearly, with
b1 = b2, type (H,λ) is also indiﬀerent between the two options. Thus, bΠ(H,λ) ≥
Π(P1, A1 | H) + λeπH(0) = Π(P2, A2 | H) + λeπH(0), where the inequality reflects
the equilibrium condition that type (H,λ) satisfy (E1). Of course, a patient
incumbent with cost level ce would strictly prefer the latter option. It follows from
Lemma 2.3 that type (L, η) strictly prefers the latter option as well: Π(P2, A2 |
L)+ηeπL(0) > Π(P1, A1 | L)+ηeπL(0) = bΠ(L, η). Consider a deviation to ψ(ce−ε).
Under Lemma 2.2, for ε > 0 and suﬃciently small, ψ(ce − ε) is equilibrium
dominated for types (H, η) and (H,λ) but not for type (L, η); thus, under (E3),
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b(ψ(ce − ε)) = 0. But then type (L, η) would deviate to ψ(ce − ε), and so (E1)
fails for this type, contradicting the supposition of an intuitive equilibrium.
Second, suppose to the contrary that (P (L, η), A(L, η)) ≡ (P1, A1) such that
Π(P1, A1 | H) + ηeπH(0) < bΠ(H, η). Once again, define ψ(ce) ≡ (P2, A2) and
recall from Lemma 2.5 that bΠ(H, η) = Π(ψ(ce) | H) + ηeπH(0). Observe that
type (H, η) now strictly prefers (P2, A2, b2 = 0) to (P1, A1, b1 = 0); likewise, a
patient incumbent with cost level ce would also strictly prefer (P2, A2, b2 = 0)
to (P1, A1, b1 = 0). Given that ce < L, Lemma 2.4 thus implies that a patient,
low-cost incumbent has the same strict preference: Π(P2, A2 | L) + ηeπL(0) >
Π(P1, A1 | L) + ηeπL(0). Consider now a deviation to ψ(ce − ε), where ε > 0 is
suﬃciently small. Using Lemma 2.2, this deviation is equilibrium dominated for
type (H, η). It is also equilibrium dominated for type (H,λ), sincebΠ(H,λ) ≥ Π(P (H, η), A(H, η) | H) + λeπH(bHη)
= Π(P2, A2 | H) + λeπH(0) + (η − λ)(eπH(0)− eπH(bHη))
> Π(P2, A2 | H) + λeπH(0).
The deviation is not equilibrium dominated for type (L, η); thus, under (E3), it
follows that b(ψ(ce − ε)) = 0. But then type (L, η) would deviate to ψ(ce − ε),
and a contradiction is again obtained.
Third, observe that an intuitive equilibrium cannot exist with (P (L, η), A(L, η)) ≡
(P1, A1) such that Π(P1, A1 | H) + ηeπH(0) > bΠ(H, η). If this inequality were to
hold, then type (H, η) would deviate and select (P1, A1) and induce the associ-
ated belief, bLη = 0, and thereby obtain a higher payoﬀ. The only remaining
possibility is that (P (L, η), A(L, η)) = ψ(ce), and the proof is thus complete.
Like the low-cost incumbent in the benchmark model, the patient, low-cost in-
cumbent undertakes a cost-reducing distortion. This incumbent thus distorts
downward its pre-entry price and distorts upward its demand-enhancing adver-
tising. Profitable entry is not deterred, however, since limit pricing and high
demand-enhancing advertising simply communicate cost information to the po-
tential entrant. A further implication is that the patient, low-cost incumbent does
not use dissipative advertising. Finally, the finding that the patient, low-cost in-
cumbent must select ψ(ce) implies that a downward incentive constraint for the
patient, high-cost incumbent must bind in any intuitive equilibrium; specifically,
type (H, η) must be indiﬀerent between following its equilibrium selection and
mimicking the selection of type (L, η).
4.2. The Impatient, Low-Cost Incumbent
I next consider the behavior of the impatient, low-cost incumbent.
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Lemma 4.5. In any intuitive equilibrium, either (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) = (P (L, η), A(L, η))
or (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) = (P (H, η), A(H, η)).
Proof: Fix an intuitive equilibrium. By Proposition 4.4, bLη = 0, ce < L and
(P (L, η), A(L, η)) = ψ(ce). First, assume to the contrary that (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) 6=
(P (t, δ), A(t, δ)) for all (t, δ) 6= (L,λ). Then bLλ = bLη = 0, and so (E1) can hold
for types (L, η) and (L,λ) only if Π(P (L, η), A(L, η) | L) = Π(P (L,λ), A(L,λ) |
L). Further, by the definition of ce, bΠ(H, η) = Π(P (L, η), A(L, η) | H) + ηeπH(0);
and (E1) for type (H, η) also requires that bΠ(H, η) ≥ Π(P (L,λ), A(L,λ) | H) +
ηeπH(0). Let (P1, A1, b1) ≡ (P (L,λ), A(L,λ), 0) and (P2, A2, b2) ≡ (P (L, η), A(L, η), 0).
Type (H, η) weakly prefers the latter option, and of course a patient incum-
bent with cost level ce would strictly prefer that latter option. Since ce < L,
it then follows from Lemma 2.4 that type (L, η) also must strictly prefer the
latter option: Π(P (L, η), A(L, η) | L) > Π(P (L,λ), A(L,λ) | L). A contra-
diction is thus obtained. Thus, type (L,λ) must pool with some type. Sec-
ond, assume to the contrary that (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) = (P (H,λ), A(H,λ)) and
(P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) 6= (P (H, η), A(H, η)). Since bLη = 0, this case is possible only
if (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) 6= (P (L, η), A(L, η)). By (E2), bHη = 1 is necessary, and so
(E1) implies that (P (H, η), A(H, η)) = ψ(H). Using (E2), it is also evident that
bLλ = bHλ = bo. For an equilibrium of this kind to exist, (E1) for type (H, η)
requires that Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(1) ≥ Π(P (H,λ), A(H,λ) | H) + ηeπH(bo).
Rewriting this inequality and using bo < 1 reveals
Π(ψ(H) | H) + λeπH(1)
≥ Π(P (H,λ), A(H,λ) | H) + λeπH(bo) + [η − λ][eπH(bo)− eπH(1)]
> Π(P (H,λ), A(H,λ) | H) + λeπH(bo).
But this indicates that type (H,λ) should deviate and select ψ(H), which con-
tradicts (E1) for type (H,λ).
The impatient, low-cost incumbent thus must pool with a patient incumbent
with either the low or the high cost type. In the model with two-dimensional
private information, some degree of pooling is thus a necessary property of any
intuitive equilibrium. This finding oﬀers a first contrast with the characterization
of intuitive equilibria for the benchmark model. As shown in Proposition 3.4,
pooling never occurs in the intuitive equilibria of the benchmark model.
23
4.3. The Three Kinds of Intuitive Equilibria
The results above establish that intuitive equilibria can be of three possible kinds:9
Kind A: In any intuitive equilibrium of Kind A, type (L, η) separates and all
other types pool. Thus, (P (L, η), A(L, η)) 6= (P (H, η), A(H, η)) and (P (H, η), A(H, η)) =
(P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) = (P (H,λ), A(H,λ)). The associated beliefs are bLη = 0 and
bHη = bA ≡ b0bo+(1−βo)(1−bo) .
Kind B: In any intuitive equilibrium of Kind B, types (L, η) and (L,λ) pool
at one selection and types (H, η) and (H,λ) pool at another selection. Thus,
(P (L, η), A(L, η)) = (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) and (P (H, η), A(H, η)) = (P (H,λ), A(H,λ)),
where (P (L, η), A(L, η)) 6= (P (H, η), A(H, η)). The associated beliefs are bLη = 0
and bHη = 1.
Kind C: In any intuitive equilibrium of Kind C, type (L, η) separates, type
(H,λ) separates, and types (H, η) and (L,λ) pool. Thus, (P (L, η), A(L, η)) 6=
(P (t, δ), A(t, δ)) for all (t, δ) 6= (L, η), (P (H,λ), A(H,λ)) 6= (P (t, δ), A(t, δ)) for
all (t, δ) 6= (H,λ), and (P (H, η), A(H, η)) = (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)). The associated
beliefs are bLη = 0, bHλ = 1 and bHη = bC ≡ boβoboβo+(1−bo)(1−βo) .
It is useful to identify some necessary properties for the selections of high-cost
incumbents in intuitive equilibria. Further results of this type are immediately
available for intuitive equilibria of Kind B and C.
Lemma 4.6. In any intuitive equilibrium of Kind B, (P (L, η), A(L, η)) = ψ(co)
and (P (H, δ), A(H, δ)) = ψ(H) for δ ∈ {η,λ}, where co < L is defined by (2.1).
In any intuitive equilibrium of Kind C, (P (H,λ), A(H,λ)) = ψ(H).
Proof: Fix an intuitive equilibrium of Kind B. Given that bHη = 1, types (H, η)
and (H,λ) cannot be deterred from selecting ψ(H). This implies that bΠ(H, η) =
Π(ψ(H) | H)+ ηeπH(0), and so ce = co. Next, fix an intuitive equilibrium of Kind
C. Given that bHλ = 1, type (H,λ) cannot be deterred from selecting ψ(H).
It is instructive to compare this lemma with Corollary 3.5 of the benchmark
model. The comparison indicates a correspondence between intuitive equilibria
9The categorization below excludes the possibility that types (L, η) and (L,λ) pool at one
selection while types (H, η) and (H,λ) separate. This possibility cannot arise in an intuitive
equilibrium, since types (H, η) and (H,λ) would then both be revealed as high-cost types: bHη =
bHλ = 1. But then both of these types must select ψ(H), in contradiction to the supposition
that they make separate selections.
24
of Kind B and intuitive equilibria for the benchmark model. Thus, intuitive
equilibria of Kind B represent the extension of the findings by Milgrom and
Roberts (1982) and Bagwell and Ramey (1988) to the model with two-dimensional
private information. This correspondence is developed further in Section 6.
5. Intuitive Equilibria of Kind A
The analysis to this point has directed attention to three possible kinds of intuitive
equilibria. I turn now to the existence of intuitive equilibria. In this section,
I focus on intuitive equilibria of Kind A. To establish conditions under which
intuitive equilibria of Kind A exist, I begin by identifying conditions under which
such equilibria do not exist.
5.1. Non-existence and Low λ
At a broad level, if λ is very low, so that an impatient incumbent puts great
weight on the pre-entry period, then it is clear that intuitive equilibria of Kind
A cannot exist. The idea is simply that an impatient, low-cost incumbent would
then only be willing to make selections that are suﬃciently close to its monopoly
selection, ψ(L), and likewise an impatient, high-cost incumbent would then only
be willing to make selections that are suﬃciently close to its monopoly selection,
ψ(H). But in an intuitive equilibrium of Kind A these types pool. Thus, since
ψ(L) 6= ψ(H), intuitive equilibria of Kind A cannot exist if λ is suﬃciently low.
A formal representation of this idea is provided in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. There exists λA > 0 such that for all λ ∈ [0,λA) an intuitive




max{Π(ψ(L) | L)−Π(P,A | L)eπL(bA)− eπL(1) , Π(ψ(H) | H)−Π(P,A | H)eπH(bA)− eπH(1) }. (5.1)
Notice that λA > 0. Now suppose that λ ∈ [0,λA) and assume to the contrary
that an intuitive equilibrium of Kind A exists. Then λ < λA ≤
max{Π(ψ(L) | L)−Π(P (L,λ), A(L,λ) | L)eπL(bA)− eπL(1) , Π(ψ(H) | H)−Π(P (L,λ), A(L,λ) | H)eπH(bA)− eπH(1) }.
Thus, for some t, Π(ψ(t) | t) + λeπt(1) > Π(P (L,λ), A(L,λ) | t) + λeπt(bA). It
follows that some type (t,λ) would earn a strictly higher payoﬀ by deviating from
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(P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) and making instead its monopoly selection, ψ(t), even if the
deviant selection induced the worst belief, b = 1. This contradicts the hypothesis
of the existence of an intuitive equilibrium of Kind A.
I next oﬀer a characterization of λA, finding that λA is achieved by a pair
(P,A) that rests on the locus ψ(c) at some point between ψ(L) and ψ(H).
Lemma 5.2. There exists cm ∈ (L,H) such that
λA =
Π(ψ(L) | L)−Π(ψ(cm) | L)eπL(bA)− eπL(1) = Π(ψ(H) | H)−Π(ψ(cm) | H)eπH(bA)− eπH(1) . (5.2)
The proof of this lemma is located in the Appendix. The value cm is defined as
the unique value in the interval (L,H) such that the second equality in (5.2) is
satisfied. The content of the lemma is then that the first and second arguments in
(5.1) are equal and indeed generate the minmax value λA when (P,A) = ψ(cm).
The determination of cm and λA is illustrated in Figure 2. As this figure
shows, the determination of these values is straightforward under the monotonic-
ity properties identified in Lemma 2.2, once it is shown that λA must be induced
by a selection that rests on the uni-dimensional locus, ψ(c). I focus henceforth on
the existence of intuitive equilibria of Kind A in which pooling occurs at ψ(cm).
Such equilibria are maximally robust against low values for λ, since no other
pooling selection can be part of an intuitive equilibrium of Kind A when λ = λA,
and no intuitive equilibria of Kind A exist when λ < λA.10
5.2. Non-existence and Low η − λ
A simple logic also suggests that intuitive equilibria of Kind A cannot exist if the
diﬀerence between patience and impatience, η−λ, is too small. Recall from Propo-
sition 4.4 that type (H, η) must be indiﬀerent between adopting its equilibrium
selection and mimicking type (L, η)0s selection. Now, in an intuitive equilibrium
of Kind A, type (H, η) pools with types (H,λ) and (L,λ).When η−λ is small, it
follows that type (H,λ) is almost indiﬀerent to mimicking type (L, η)0s selection.
Type (L,λ) has the same patience level as type (H,λ); however, in terms of pre-
entry profit, type (L,λ) is more attracted to cost-reducing distortions (i.e., the
selection ψ(ce)) than is type (H,λ). Thus, when η − λ is suﬃciently small, type
(L,λ) would deviate and mimic type (L, η).
A formal expression of this logic is provided in the following lemma.
10 It is also possible to hold the patience levels, η and λ, fixed and provide suﬃcient conditions
for non-existence in terms of bo and βo. Observe that λA grows without bound as bA goes to
unity. Thus, when bA is suﬃciently close to unity, λA > η > λ and non-existence of intuitive
equilibria of Kind A is assured. In turn, bA approaches unity when bo or βo approaches unity.
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Lemma 5.3. In any intuitive equilibrium of Kind A in which (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) =
ψ(cm), it is necessary that (i) (P (L, η), A(L, η)) = ψ(ce), where ce satisfies ce < L
and bΠ(H, η) ≡ Π(ψ(cm) | H) + ηeπH(bA) = Π(ψ(ce) | H) + ηeπH(0), and (ii)
λ ≤ λA, where λA < η is defined by
λA ≡
Π(ψ(cm) | L)−Π(ψ(ce) | L)eπL(0)− eπL(bA) . (5.3)
Proof: Fix an intuitive equilibrium of Kind A in which (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) =
ψ(cm). Since types (L,λ) and (H, η) pool, it follows that bΠ(H, η) ≡ Π(ψ(cm) |
H)+ηeπH(bA). The application of Proposition 4.4 implies that (P (L, η), A(L, η)) =
ψ(ce), where ce satisfies ce < L and bΠ(H, η) = Π(ψ(ce) | H) + ηeπH(0). It
follows that ce is uniquely defined in any intuitive equilibrium of Kind A in
which (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) = ψ(cm); thus, ce is well-defined in (5.3). I now show
that λ ≤ λA. The posited equilibrium can exist only if type (L,λ) does not
gain by deviating from (ψ(cm), bA) to (ψ(ce), 0). Referring to (5.3), observe thatbΠ(L,λ) ≡ Π(ψ(cm) | L)+λeπL(bA) ≥ Π(ψ(ce) | L)+λeπL(0) if and only if λ ≤ λA.
Thus, the posited equilibrium can exist only if λ ≤ λA. Finally, using (5.3), ob-
serve that λA < η if and only if Π(ψ(ce) | L)+ ηeπL(0) > Π(ψ(cm) | L)+ ηeπL(bA).
Let (P1, A1, b1) ≡ (ψ(cm), bA) and (P2, A2, b2) ≡ (ψ(ce), 0). By construction, type
(H, η) is indiﬀerent between these two options. An incumbent with cost level ce
strictly prefers the latter option. Given that b2 = 0 < b1 = bA and ce < H, Lemma
2.3 ensures that type (L, η) strictly prefers the latter option. Thus, λA < η.
Thus, by Lemmas 5.1 and 5.3, if an intuitive equilibrium of Kind A is to exist,
then λ can neither be too low (i.e., below λA) nor too near η (i.e., above λA and
thereby near η).
5.3. Existence
Guided by the preceding results, I now state suﬃcient conditions for the existence
of an intuitive equilibrium of Kind A. In order to establish existence for the lowest
possible values of λ (i.e., even when λ = λA), the equilibrium is specified so that
the pooling selection is ψ(cm), where cm ∈ (L,H) is defined in Lemma 5.2. The
suﬃcient conditions are motivated as follows. As suggested by Lemma 5.3, a first
assumption is that λ is bound below η. Consistent with Lemma 5.1, a second
assumption is that λ is not too low. Finally, an intuitive equilibrium can exist
only if ce < L. As explained below, however, this inequality follows from the first
assumption. I argue below that both assumptions hold if η is suﬃciently large
and λ is not too low.
Formally, the existence result is now captured in the following proposition.
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Proposition 5.4. Assume
λ ≤ λA ≡
Π(ψ(cm) | L)−Π(ψ(ce) | L)eπL(0)− eπL(bA) (5.4)
λ ≥ λA =
Π(ψ(t) | t)−Π(ψ(cm) | t)eπt(bA)− eπt(1) , t = L,H (5.5)
where cm ∈ (L,H) is defined in Lemma 5.2 and ce < cm is defined by Π(ψ(cm) |
H)+ηeπH(bA) = Π(ψ(ce) | H)+ηeπH(0). Then there exists an intuitive equilibrium
of Kind A in which (P (L, η), A(L, η)) = ψ(ce) and (P (t, δ), A(t, δ)) = ψ(cm) for
(t, δ) 6= (L, η), where ce < L.
The proof of this proposition is located in the Appendix.
Consider the ranges for η and λ over which (5.4) and (5.5) hold. Clearly, (5.5)
holds if λ is not too small. Consider (5.4). Given the definition of ce < cm < H, it
follows as in the proof of Lemma 5.3 that η > λA. Observe that λA is independent
of λ and depends on η through ce. Lemma 2.2 implies that ce is strictly decreasing
in η. When η is near zero, ce is approximately cm. As η rises, ce falls toward and
then below L. Referring to (5.4) and using Lemma 2.2, it thus follows that λA is
approximately zero when η is near zero, strictly decreases as η rises toward the
level that induces ce = L, and then strictly increases as η rises beyond this level.
Given λ ≥ 0, (5.4) requires λA ≥ 0 and thus that ce < L. In fact, (5.4) and (5.5)
require that η is suﬃciently high that λA rises to or above λA. I conclude that an
intuitive equilibrium of Kind A exists if the impatient type of incumbent is not
too impatient and the patient type of incumbent is suﬃciently patient.11
The constructed intuitive equilibrium is not the only such equilibrium of Kind
A. Other constructions may exist which employ diﬀerent pooling selections. The
intuitive equilibrium analyzed in Proposition 5.4 deserves particular attention,
however, since its existence is maximally robust to lower values of λ.
5.4. Economic Interpretation
I consider now the economic interpretation of the constructed intuitive equilib-
rium of Kind A. The behavior of the patient, low-cost incumbent is analogous to
that of the low-cost incumbent in the benchmark model. This type of incumbent
undertakes a cost-reducing distortion and does not deter profitable entry. The
11For η suﬃciently high, it is possible to achieve λA ≥ λA while respecting ce > 0, if Π(ψ(0) | L)
is suﬃciently low (and possibly negative) or if bA is suﬃciently small. It is possible that η > 1
is then required. This possibility can be easily entertained if the post-entry stage allows for
multiple periods.
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other types of incumbent behave in a more novel fashion. In the constructed
equilibrium, the patient and impatient high-cost incumbent types also engage
in a cost-reducing distortion and thus limit price and distort demand-enhancing
advertising upward. These types, however, pool with the impatient, low-cost in-
cumbent. The potential entrant is then unable to infer the incumbent’s cost type;
as a consequence, when the incumbent actually has a high-cost type, entry that
would be profitable under complete information may not occur in equilibrium.
In other words, when the incumbent has high costs, limit pricing and high ad-
vertising may be used to deter profitable entry. The behavior of the impatient,
low-cost incumbent is perhaps most unusual. This type of incumbent engages in a
cost-increasing distortion, with a pre-entry price that exceeds its monopoly price
and a level of demand-enhancing advertising that is below its monopoly level, and
sometimes faces entry that would not have been profitable under complete infor-
mation. Thus, this type of incumbent adopts a “soft” form of pre-entry behavior
and sometimes ends up inducing unprofitable entry.
The constructed equilibrium oﬀers a partial confirmation of the predictions of
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Bagwell and Ramey (1988). This confirmation is
captured in the behavior of the patient, low-cost incumbent. The equilibrium also
oﬀers support for the predictions of an earlier literature, wherein contributions by
Bain (1949) and Williamson (1963) describe conditions under which limit pricing
and high advertising may deter entry. The predictions of the earlier literature find
representation in the behavior of the patient and impatient high-cost incumbent
types. Finally, the constructed equilibrium identifies a new behavior for the type
of incumbent that is impatient and has low costs. This incumbent adopts a soft
pre-entry stance and sometimes induces unprofitable entry.
6. Intuitive Equilibria of Kind B
I now focus on intuitive equilibria of Kind B. Once again, I begin by identifying
conditions under which such equilibria do not exist. I then provide suﬃcient
conditions for existence.
6.1. Non-existence and Low λ
In general terms, it is clear that an intuitive equilibrium of Kind B cannot exist
when λ is suﬃciently small. Recall from Lemma 4.6 that an intuitive equilibrium
of Kind B exists only if, regardless of the level of patience, an incumbent with a
low cost type selects ψ(co) while an incument with a high cost type selects ψ(H).
If λ is small, however, an impatient, low-cost incumbent is unwilling to make a
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selection that is not close to ψ(L). Given that co < L, it is thus inevitable that
an intuitive equilibrium of Kind B fails to exist when λ is suﬃciently small.
A formal representation of this argument is provided in the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1. There exists λB ∈ (0, η) such that for all λ ∈ [0,λB) an intuitive
equilibrium of Kind B does not exist.
Proof: Define
λB ≡
Π(ψ(L) | L)−Π(ψ(co) | L)eπL(0)− eπL(1) ,
where co < L is defined by (2.1). Thus, λB > 0. Further, λB < η if and only if
Π(ψ(co) | L)+ ηeπL(0) > Π(ψ(L) | L)+ ηeπL(1), and the latter inequality is estab-
lished using Lemma 2.4 in the first step of the proof of Proposition 3.3. Suppose
now that λ ∈ [0,λB) and that an intuitive equilibrium of Kind B exists. In such
an equilibrium, type (L,λ) must prefer (ψ(co), bLλ = 0) to (ψ(L), b(ψ(L))). Thus,
it is necessary that
Π(ψ(co) | L) + λeπL(0) ≥ Π(ψ(L) | L) + λeπL(b(ψ(L))) ≥ Π(ψ(L) | L) + λeπL(1).
But this implies that λ ≥ λB, and so a contradiction is obtained.
It is useful to emphasize the finding that λB ∈ (0, η). This ensures that there
always exists a range of possible values for λ such that λ ≥ λB and η > λ.
Thus, intuitive equilibria of Kind B cannot exist if the impatient incumbent is
too impatient. As shown in Lemma 5.1, a similar non-existence result applies for
intuitive equilibria of Kind A. It is thus possible to state the following corollary:
Corollary 6.2. Let λ ≡ min{λA,λB} ∈ (0, η). For λ < λ, there does not exist
an intuitive equilibrium of Kind A or Kind B.
Thus, if an impatient incumbent is suﬃciently impatient, then an intuitive equi-
librium can exist only if it is of Kind C.
6.2. Existence
I next consider the existence of an intuitive equilibrium of Kind B.
Proposition 6.3. Assume
λ ≥ λB ≡
Π(ψ(L) | L)−Π(ψ(co) | L)eπL(0)− eπL(1) ,
where co < L is defined by (2.1). Then there exists an intuitive equilibrium of
Kind B in which (P (L, η), A(L, η)) = (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) = ψ(co) and (P (H, η), A(H, η)) =
(P (H,λ), A(Hλ)) = ψ(H).
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The proof of this proposition is located in the Appendix.
Recall from Lemma 6.1 that λB ∈ (0, η); thus, for any given η and λ such that
λ ∈ [λB, η), an intuitive equilibrium of Kind B exists. Given η > λ, an intuitive
equilibrium of Kind B thus exists if λ is not too small, so that λ ≥ λB. The
suﬃcient condition may also be interepreted in terms of the size of η−λ.When η
is near its lower bound, so that the inequality in Assumption 3 just holds, λB is
near zero. As η rises, λB remains below η; however, it follows from (2.1) that co
strictly declines and thus by Lemma 2.2 that λB strictly increases. Thus, λ ≥ λB
ensures that λ never falls too far below η. The constructed intuitive equilibrium
captures the only intuitive equilibrium outcome of Kind B. This outcome is thus
uniquely predicted when η − λ is small, since intuitive equilibria of Kind A and
C (see below) fail to exist in that case.
6.3. Economic Interpretation
Intuitive equilibria of Kind B capture the themes developed in the models by
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Bagwell and Ramey (1988), wherein the incum-
bent has one dimension of private information. This work is represented above
in the analysis of the benchmark model. In the present model, the incumbent
has two dimensions of private information; yet, in intuitive equilibria of Kind B,
the incumbent’s behavior is identical to that predicted by the benchmark model.
In particular, whether the incumbent is patient or impatient, a low-cost incum-
bent undertakes a cost-reducing distortion and a high-cost incumbent makes its
monopoly selection and reveals its cost type. The incumbent’s private information
as to its patience level then does not aﬀect the incumbent’s pre-entry selections
nor the potential entrant’s entry decision. As noted above, however, intuitive
equilibria of Kind B cannot exist if an impatient incumbent is too impatient.
7. Existence of Intuitive Equilibria of Kind C
I now focus on intuitive equilibria of Kind C. The existence of such equilibria
is of particular interest given the finding presented in Corollary 6.2 that neither
intuitive equilibira of Kind A nor Kind B exist when the impatient incumbent is
too impatient. Thus, if an intuitive equilibrium is to exist in this situation, then
it must be an intuitive equilibrium of Kind C. As before, I first explore conditions
under which such equilibria do not exist, and I then provide suﬃcient conditions
for existence.
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7.1. Nonexistence and Low λ or η
In any intuitive equilibrium of Kind C, type (L, η) separates from all other types,
types (H, η) and (L,λ) pool, and type (H,λ) also separates from all other types.
The associated beliefs are bLη = 0, bHλ = 1 and bHη = bC . Further, as Lemma 4.6
indicates, type (H,λ) separates by selecting ψ(H). Finally, according to Propo-
sition 4.4, type (L, η) separates by selecting ψ(ce), where ce must be strictly less
than L and satisfy bΠ(H, η) = Π(ψ(ce) | H) + ηeπH(0).
As summarized in Corollary 6.2, the existence of intuitive equilibria of Kind
A or B is impossible when λ is suﬃciently small. The key tension is that such in-
tuitive equilibria impose requirements on the selections of impatient incumbents;
however, when λ is suﬃciently small, an impatient incumbent is only willing to
make selections that are suﬃciently close to its monopoly selection. In intuitive
equilibria of Kind C, this tension is less pronounced. First, such equilibria require
that an incumbent of type (H,λ)make its monopoly selection, ψ(H). Second, such
equilibria oﬀer some flexibility with respect to the selection at which types (H, η)
and (L,λ) pool. One important possibility is that these types pool at the low-cost
monopoly selection, ψ(L). The discussion here thus suggests that intuitive equi-
libria of Kind C may exist even when λ is very low (e.g., zero). Notice, though,
that a related incentive issue then may arise for type (H, η). If η is small as well,
then a patient, high-cost incumbent may be unwilling to make a selection such
as ψ(L) that diﬀers from its monopoly selection, ψ(H).
I now explore these issues at a more formal level. Suppose that an intuitive
equilibrium of Kind C exists. It then must be the case that types (L,λ) and (H, η)
pool at some selection (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)). The associated incentive constraints
imply restrictions on λ and η.
First, it is necessary that type (L,λ) cannot gain by deviating to its monopoly
selection. If such a deviation induces the most pessimistic belief, so that b(ψ(L)) =
1, then the relevant condition is Π(P (L,λ), A(L,λ) | L) + λeπL(bC) ≥ Π(ψ(L) |
L) + λeπL(1). This condition may be re-written as
λ ≥ λC ≡
Π(ψ(L) | L)−Π(P (L,λ), A(L,λ) | L)eπL(bC)− eπL(1) . (7.1)
Using (7.1), notice that λC = 0 when (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) = ψ(L); thus, when
pooling occurs at ψ(L), the lower bound on λ is in fact zero.
Second, it is necessary that type (H, η) cannot gain by deviating to its monopoly
selection. Since b(ψ(H)) ≡ bHλ = 1, the relevant condition is Π(P (L,λ), A(L,λ) |
H) + ηeπH(bC) ≥ Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(1). Equivalently, this condition is given as
η ≥ η
C








As conditions (7.1) and (7.2) illustrate, if an intuitive equilibrium of Kind
C specifies pooling at the low-cost monopoly selection, ψ(L), then λC = 0 and
so λ can assume any nonnegative value. In this case, however, η
C
> 0, and as
a consequence it is necessary that η be suﬃciently large. Alternatively, if an
intuitive equilibrium of Kind C specifies pooling at ψ(H), then λC > 0, and so λ
cannot be too small. For this specification, η
C
= 0; thus, no additional restrictions
arise for η beyond the maintained assumption that η > λ. A further possibillity
is that an intuitive equilibrium specifies pooling at ψ(c) for some c ∈ (L,H). In
that case, λC > 0 and ηC > 0 would be required.
As above, I emphasize the intuitive equilibrium whose existence is most ro-
bust against low values for λ. This focus is perhaps especially appropriate at this
juncture, since Corollary 6.2 raises the question of whether any intuitive equi-
librium exists when λ is small. Thus, in the following, I focus on the potential
existence of intuitive equilibria of Kind C in which pooling occurs at the low-cost





≡ Π(ψ(H) | H)−Π(ψ(L) | H)eπH(bC)− eπH(1) , (7.3)
where η
C
> 0. The next lemma contains the corresponding non-existence result.
Lemma 7.1. For all η < η
C
an intuitive equilibrium of Kind C in which (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) =
ψ(L) does not exist.
7.2. Non-existence and Low η − λ
Like intuitive equilibria of Kind A, intuitive equilibria of Kind C confront ex-
istence problems when the diﬀerence between patience and impatience, η − λ,
is small. The general idea is easily related. As established in Proposition 4.4,
type (H, η) must be indiﬀerent between adopting its equilibrium selection and
mimicking type (L, η)0s selection. In an intuitive equilibrium of Kind C, type
(H, η) pools with type (L,λ). When η − λ is small, type (L,λ) has almost the
same patience level as type (H, η); however, type (L,λ) is more attracted to cost-
reducing distortions (i.e., the selection ψ(ce)) than is type (H, η). Thus, when
η − λ is suﬃciently small, type (L,λ) would deviate and mimic type (L, η).
This idea is captured at a formal level in the following lemma.
Lemma 7.2. In any intuitive equilibrium of Kind C in which (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) =
ψ(L), it is necessary that (i) (P (L, η), A(L, η)) = ψ(ce), where ce satisfies ce < L
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and bΠ(H, η) ≡ Π(ψ(L) | H)+ηeπH(bC) = Π(ψ(ce) | H)+ηeπH(0), and (ii) λ ≤ λC ,
where λC ∈ (0, η) is defined by
λC ≡
Π(ψ(L) | L)−Π(ψ(ce) | L)eπL(0)− eπL(bC) . (7.4)
Proof: Fix an intuitive equilibrium of Kind C in which (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) =
ψ(L). Then bΠ(H, η) ≡ Π(ψ(L) | H)+ηeπH(bC). By Proposition 4.4, (P (L, η), A(L, η)) =
ψ(ce), where ce satisfies ce < L and bΠ(H, η) = Π(ψ(ce) | H)+ηeπH(0). Thus, ce is
uniquely defined for any intuitive equilibrium of Kind C in which (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) =
ψ(L), and so ce is well-defined in (7.4). I now show that λ ≤ λC . The posited equi-
librium can exist only if type (L,λ) does not gain by deviating from (ψ(L), bC)
to (ψ(ce), 0). Referring to (7.4), observe that bΠ(L,λ) ≡ Π(ψ(L) | L)+λeπL(bC) ≥
Π(ψ(ce) | L) + λeπL(0) if and only if λC ≥ λ. Thus, the posited equilibrium can
exist only if λ ≤ λC . Next, observe from (7.4) that λC > 0. Finally, using (7.4)
observe that η > λC if and only if Π(ψ(ce) | L)+ηeπL(0) > Π(ψ(L) | L)+ηeπL(bC).
Let (P1, A1, b1) ≡ (ψ(L), bC) and (P2, A2, b2) ≡ (ψ(ce), 0). By construction, type
(H, η) is indiﬀerent between these two options. An incumbent with cost level ce
strictly prefers the latter option. Given that b2 = 0 < b1 = bC and ce < H, Lemma
2.3 ensures that type (L, η) strictly prefers the latter option. Thus, η > λC .
Thus, for such an equilibrium to exist, λ cannot be too high (i.e., above λC and
thereby near η).
7.3. Non-existence and High λ
In an intuitive equilibrium of Kind C, an impatient, high-cost incumbent simply
makes its monopoly selection and reveals its type. This type thus induces the
belief bHλ = 1 and faces the maximal probability of entry. If this type is not too
impatient, then it thus may be tempted to mimic the pooling selection and enjoy
thereby the belief bC . When pooling occurs at ψ(L), an intuitive equilibrium of
Kind C can thus exist only if λ is suﬃciently low that an impatient, high-cost
incumbent prefers (ψ(H), 1) to (ψ(L), bC).
This logic is confirmed in the following lemma:
Lemma 7.3. For all λ > η
C
, an intuitive equilibrium of Kind C in which (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) =
ψ(L) does not exist.
Proof: Fix (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) = ψ(L) and recall that (7.3) defines η
C
> 0.
Assume to the contrary that λ > η
C
and an intuitive equilibrium of Kind C
in which (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) = ψ(L) exists. Under the latter assumption, (E1)
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and (E2) imply that type (H,λ) prefers (ψ(H), 1) to (ψ(L), bC). Thus, Π(ψ(H) |
H) + λeπH(1) ≥ Π(ψ(L) | H) + λeπH(bC). But by (7.3) this is possible if and only
if λ ≤ η
C
, which contradicts the former assumption.
Together, Lemmas 7.1-7.3 suggest that an intuitive equilibrium of Kind C in which
pooling occurs at ψ(L)may exist, if η is suﬃciently large and λ is suﬃciently small
both absolutely and relative to η. This suggestion is explored in more detail below.
7.4. Existence
Drawing on the preceding results, I now identify suﬃcient conditions for the
existence of an intuitive equilibrium of Kind C. To establish existence for the
lowest possible values of λ (i.e., even when λ = 0), the equilibrium is specified so
that the pooling selection is ψ(L). The suﬃcient conditions are then expressed in
three assumptions. As suggested by Lemma 7.1, the first assumption is that η is
suﬃciently large. Next, as suggested by Lemma 7.2, a second assumption is that
λ is bound below η. Finally, as suggested by Lemma 7.3, a third assumption is
that λ not be too high. As discussed further below, all of these assumptions are
sure to hold if η is suﬃciently large and λ is suﬃciently small.




≡ Π(ψ(H) | H)−Π(ψ(L) | H)eπH(bC)− eπH(1) (7.5)
λ ≤ λC ≡
Π(ψ(L) | L)−Π(ψ(ce) | L)eπL(0)− eπL(bC) (7.6)
λ ≤ η
C
≡ Π(ψ(H) | H)−Π(ψ(L) | H)eπH(bC)− eπH(1) , (7.7)
where ce < L is defined by Π(ψ(ce) | H) + ηeπH(0) = Π(ψ(L) | H) + ηeπH(bC).
Then there exists an intuitive equilibrium of Kind C in which (P (L, η), A(L, η)) =
ψ(ce), (P (H,λ), A(H,λ)) = ψ(H) and (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) = (P (H, η), A(H, η)) =
ψ(L).
The proof of this proposition is located in the Appendix.
An intuitive equilibrium of Kind C thus exists under assumptions (7.5)-(7.7).
Clearly, (7.5) holds if η is suﬃciently large, and (7.7) holds if λ is suﬃciently
small. Consider (7.6). With ce defined by Π(ψ(ce) | H) + ηeπH(0) = Π(ψ(L) |
H) + ηeπH(bC) and bC > 0, it follows that ce < L. As shown in the proof of
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Lemma 7.2, η > λC > 0 also follows. Observe that λC is independent of λ and
depends on η only through ce. Lemma 2.2 implies that ce is strictly decreasing in
η. By (7.6), Lemma 2.2 thus also implies that λC is strictly increasing in η. Hence,
an intuitive equilibrium of Kind C exists if the impatient type of incumbent is
suﬃciently impatient and the patient type of incumbent is suﬃciently patient.
Under appropriate assumptions, other intuitive equilibrium of Kind C can be
constructed which employ diﬀerent values for the pooling selection. As empha-
sized above, however, the constructed intuitive equilibrium deserves particular
attention, since its existence is maximally robust to lower values λ. Indeed, the
constructed equilibrium outcome is the only intuitive equilibrium outcome of Kind
C that exists even when λ = 0.
7.5. Economic Interpretation
In the constructed equilibrium, the behavior of the patient, low-cost incumbent
is again analogous to that of the low-cost incumbent in the benchmark model.
Separation occurs in the form of a cost-reducing distortion, and profitable entry
is not deterred. Also, the behavior of the impatient, high-cost incumbent is
analogous to that of the high-cost incumbent in the benchmark model. The
price-advertising selection is not distorted, and entry occurs precisely when it
is profitable. The novel behavior is displayed by the impatient, low-cost and
patient, high-cost types of incumbent. These types pool, and in the constructed
equilibrium they pool at the low-cost monopoly selection. The potential entrant
is unable to infer the incumbent’s cost type upon seeing this selection; hence,
when the incumbent has high costs, profitable entry is sometimes deterred. The
impatient, high-cost incumbent therefore uses limit pricing and high demand-
enhancing advertising so as to hide its type and, thereby, deter entry that would
be profitable were its cost type known. The behavior of the impatient, low-
cost incumbent is again striking. In the constructed equilibrium, this type of
incumbent does not distort its price-advertising selection and sometimes faces
entry that would be unprofitable were its cost type known.
The constructed intuitive equilibrium of Kind C has important similarities
with the constructed equilibrium of Kind A. The key diﬀerence is that, in the
former, fewer distortions occur, since the incumbent does not distort its behavior
when it is impatient, regardless of its cost type. It is precisely this feature that
ensures that the constructed equilibrium of Kind C can exist even when λ = 0.
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8. Intuitive Equilibria and Complete Impatience
The preceding analysis is conducted under the assumption that the incumbent
may be patient or impatient: δ = η or δ = λ, where η > λ. In the present
section, I explore the extreme case in which the impatient incumbent is completely
impatient: λ = 0. This case is of special interest, since it captures the arguably
realistic possibility that the incumbent is focused exclusively on the “short term.”
It is also of particular interest due to its great tractability. By analyzing the
extreme case in which λ = 0, it is easy to illustrate the general point that intuitive
equilibria may fail to exist. I conclude the section by showing that an intuitive
equilibrium in mixed strategies does exist when λ = 0.
8.1. A Non-Existence Result
I assume now that λ = 0. By Corollary 6.2, intuitive equilibria of Kind A and
Kind B do not exist. Suppose an intuitive equilibrium of Kind C exists. Recall
from (7.1) that an intuitive equilibrium of Kind C can exist only if λ ≥ λC .
Given λ = 0, it is thus necessary that λC = 0. In turn, this means that types
(H, η) and (L,λ) must pool at ψ(L). Next, it is useful to remember that type
(H, η)0s downward incentive constraint (where it mimics type (L, η)) must bind
in an intuitive equilibrium. Formally, with (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) = ψ(L), Lemma 7.2
indicates that (P (L, η), A(L, η)) = ψ(ce), where ce satisfies ce < L and Π(ψ(L) |
H) + ηeπH(bC) = Π(ψ(ce) | H) + ηeπH(0). Finally, as observed in Lemma 4.6, in
any intuitive equilibrium of Kind C, (P (H,λ), A(H,λ)) = ψ(H). In summary, if
an intuitive equilibrium exists when λ = 0, then it must take the form of the
intuitive equilibrium of Kind C constructed in Proposition 7.4.
Now, if an intuitive equilibrium of Kind C exists, it is also necessary that type
(H, η) does not gain by making its monopoly selection, ψ(H). As shown in (7.2),
when λ = 0 and thus (P (L,λ), A(L,λ)) = ψ(L), this requirement is
η ≥ η
C
≡ Π(ψ(H) | H)−Π(ψ(L) | H)eπH(bC)− eπH(1) > 0.
Thus, if λ = 0 and an intuitive equilibrium of Kind C exists, then η ≥ η
C
> 0.
The preceding discussion now may be summarized in a proposition.
Proposition 8.1. Assume λ = 0 and
η
C
≡ Π(ψ(H) | H)−Π(ψ(L) | H)eπH(bC)− eπH(1) > η. (8.1)
Then an intuitive equilibrium does not exist.
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The assumptions made in this proposition are consistent with the maintained
assumptions. In particular, Assumption 3 and (8.1) are both satisfied if
Π(ψ(H) | H)−Π(ψ(L) | H)eπH(bC)− eπH(1) > η > Π(ψ(H) | H)−Π(ψ(L) | H)eπH(0)− eπH(1) .
Intuitively, η may be suﬃciently large that type (H, η) prefers (ψ(L), 0) to (ψ(H), 1)
and yet no so large that this type prefers (ψ(L), bC) to (ψ(H), 1).
This analysis reveals an important point of diﬀerence between the benchmark
model with one-dimensional private information and the model with two dimen-
sions of private information. In the benchmark model, as Corollary 3.5 confirms,
an intuitive equilibrium always exists. By contrast, as Proposition 8.1 reveals,
in the model with two dimensions of private information, it is possible that an
intuitive equilibrium fails to exist.
8.2. A Mixed-Strategy Resolution
The non-existence result reported in Proposition 8.1 can be addressed by including
mixed strategies. Assume λ = 0 and that (8.1) holds. Using Assumption 3, I may
now define bb ∈ (0, bC) such that
Π(ψ(H) | H)−Π(ψ(L) | H)eπH(bb)− eπH(1) = η. (8.2)
Suppose now that type (H, η) mixes between the selections ψ(L) and ψ(H), while
type (H,λ) selects ψ(H), type (L,λ) selects ψ(L), and type (L, η) selects ψ(ce),
where the determination of ce is described below. Type (H, η) selects ψ(L) with
an appropriate probability so that the application of (E2) yields b(ψ(L)) = bb. As
above, (E2) requires b(ψ(ce)) = 0 < 1 = b(ψ(H)). When type (H, η) mixes in
this fashion, the induced belief bb is defined by (8.2) to ensure that type (H, η)
is indeed indiﬀerent between (ψ(L),bb) and (ψ(H), 1). The cost level ce < L is
now determined to leave type (H, η) indiﬀerent between (ψ(L),bb) and (ψ(ce), 0).
Using (2.1), it thus follows that ce = co.
This discussion leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 8.2. Assume λ = 0 and that (8.1) holds. Define bb ∈ (0, bC) by (8.2)
and co < L by (2.1). Then there exists a (mixed-strategy) intuitive equilibrium in
which type (H, η) mixes between ψ(L) and ψ(H), type (H,λ) selects ψ(H), type
(L,λ) selects ψ(L), and type (L, η) selects ψ(co), where type (H, η) selects ψ(L)
with an appropriate probability so that under Bayesian updating b(ψ(L)) = bb.
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The proposition specifies that any type (t,λ) selects ψ(t). This is clearly the
necessary specification when λ = 0. As noted above, under the construction, type
(H, η) is indiﬀerent between (ψ(L),bb) and (ψ(co), 0) and between (ψ(L),bb) and
(ψ(H), 1). Hence, this type cannot gain by altering the probability with which
it selects ψ(L), ψ(H) or ψ(co).12 Using Lemma 2.3, if type (H, η) is indiﬀerent
between (ψ(L),bb) and (ψ(co), 0) where co < L, then type (L, η) must strictly
prefer (ψ(co), 0) to (ψ(L),bb) and thus (ψ(H), 1). From here, the proposition can
be proved following steps similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 7.4.13
8.3. Economics Interpretation
The analysis of mixed-strategy intuitive equilibria presented here confirms that
intuitive equilibria exist even if λ = 0 and η is small. The constructed intuitive
equilibrium can be interpreted in the same manner as the intuitive equilibrium
of Kind C. The only diﬀerence here is that the incumbent of type (H, η) does not
select ψ(L) with certainty but rather randomizes between the selection ψ(L) and
the selection ψ(H). Thus, in the constructed intuitive equilibrium, a patient, high-
cost incumbent randomizes between two approaches: it either does not distort its
selection and faces the maximal probability of entry, or it limit prices and distorts
advertising upward and deters some profitable entry.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, I consider a model in which an incumbent has two dimensions of
private information as well as two signals. The incumbent is privately informed
as to its cost type and level of patience, and benefits if a potential entrant infers
a low cost type. The potential entrant’s inference, however, is confounded by the
fact that it is also uninformed with regard to the incumbent’s level of patience.
The incumbent’s two signals are its pre-entry price and advertising.
The paper oﬀers three main contributions. First, building on earlier work
by Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Bagwell and Ramey (1988), I analyze a
benchmark model in which the incumbent is privately informed only about its
costs. In the unique intuitive equilibrium outcome of the benchmark model,
12Note, though, that type (H, η) selects ψ(co) with zero probability. Otherwise, type (L, η)
would not enjoy the belief bLη = 0, and under (E3) this type would deviate.
13More generally, the constructed mixed-strategy intuitive equilibrium exists if (8.1) holds and
λ ≤ [Π(ψ(L) | L)−Π(ψ(co) | L)]/[eπL(0)−eπL(bb)] ≡ λmix. The latter condition ensures that type
(L,λ) does not gain by deviating to (ψ(co), 0). Referring to Proposition 7.4, it thus follows that
a (possibly mixed-strategy) intuitive equilibrium is sure to exist, if λ is not too high (so that
λ ≤ λmix when (8.1) holds and λ ≤ min{λC , η
C
} when (8.1) fails).
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the low-cost incumbent uses limit pricing and upward distortions in (demand-
enhancing) advertising; however, these actions do not deter profitable entry.
Second, I characterize the intuitive equilibria of the general model with two-
dimensional private information. On the one hand, the analysis provides support
for the predictions in the benchmark model. In any intuitive equilibrium, a pa-
tient, low-cost incumbent limit prices and distorts demand-enhancing advertising
upward, and such behavior ensures that entry occurs exactly when it is profitable.
In intuitive equilibria of Kind B, the patient and impatient low-cost incumbent
types make one selection while the patient and impatient high-cost incumbent
types make a diﬀerent selection. On the other hand, the analysis also provides
support for an older literature with contributions by Bain (1949) and Williamson
(1963) that emphasizes the entry-deterrence eﬀects of limit pricing and aggressive
advertising. In intuitive equilibria of Kinds A and C, the patient, high-cost incum-
bent pools with the impatient, low-cost incumbent (and perhaps the impatient,
high-cost incumbent). In the featured intuitive equilibria, the high-cost, patient
incumbent limit prices and distorts its demand-enhancing advertising upward;
further, profitable entry is sometimes deterred. The analysis also oﬀers a novel
finding. Intuitive equilibria are constructed in which an impatient incumbent with
low costs adopts a soft pre-entry stance - it prices above its monopoly level and
distorts its demand-enhancing advertising downward - and thereby sometimes
induces unprofitable entry.
Third, at a methodological level, the paper contributes by deriving predictions
for intuitive equilibria in a model with multiple signals and multiple dimensions of
private information. The Cho-Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion is shown to remain
powerful in this setting. The analysis also suggests that the existence of (pure-
strategy) intuitive equilibria may be more problematic when private information
has more than one dimension.
Several important directions for future research are apparent. First, the model
analyzed here is special, in that the receiver has no direct interest in one of the
variables about which the sender is privately informed. This assumption seems
reasonable for the application at hand and makes the analysis more tractable but
is quite restrictive. Second, future work might consider alternative signals. For
example, if the incumbent could commit in the pre-entry period to burn money in
the post-entry period, then such a signal might provide an eﬀective means through
which the incumbent could reveal its patience level to the potential entrant. This
perspective suggests that pooling might be less likely to occur, if the incumbent
could also signal its information with appropriate capital-market instruments.
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10. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5.2: The two arguments in (5.1) generate associated iso-profit
curves; in particular, when the argument for an incumbent with cost type t takes
some value kt, then the associated iso-profit curve for this incumbent type is
Π(P,A | t) = Π(ψ(t) | t) − kt(eπt(bA) − eπt(1)). The iso-profit curve is centered
around the point ψ(t). Let (P ∗, A∗) denote a selection that induces λA.
A first claim is that λA < [Π(ψ(H) | H) − Π(ψ(L) | H)]/[eπH(bA) − eπH(1)].
Since λA is the minimized value of the maximum function in (5.1), it is no greater
than the maximum function when evaluated at ψ(L). By Lemma 2.2, the maxi-
mum function when evaluated at ψ(L+ ε) is lower than when evaluated at ψ(L),
for ε > 0 and suﬃciently small. Thus, λA must be strictly less than the maximum
function when evaluated at ψ(L), and the claim is established.
A second claim is that (P ∗, A∗) = ψ(c) for some c ∈ (L,H). Suppose to
the contrary that (P ∗, A∗) = ψ(c) for some c ≤ L. Referring to (5.1) and using
Lemma 2.2 , it is clear that a strictly lower value for λA could be induced by
using (P,A) = ψ(c+ ε) for ε > 0 and suﬃciently small. A similar contradiction
arises if (P ∗, A∗) = ψ(c) for some c ≥ H. Suppose next that (P ∗, A∗) 6= ψ(c) for
any c, and let kt be evaluated at (P ∗, A∗). Using the first claim and the definition
of λA,
Π(ψ(H) | H)−Π(ψ(L) | H)eπH(bA)− eπH(1) > λA ≥ kH = Π(ψ(H) | H)−Π(P
∗, A∗ | H)eπH(bA)− eπH(1) .
Thus, Π(ψ(H) | H) > Π(P ∗, A∗ | H) > Π(ψ(L) | H), and so under Lemma 2.2
there exists c∗ ∈ (L,H) such that Π(ψ(c∗) | H) = Π(P ∗, A∗ | H). Let (P1, A1) ≡
(P ∗, A∗) and (P2, A2) ≡ ψ(c∗). By Lemma 2.1, ∆(c) is strictly decreasing, and
so Π(ψ(c∗) | L) > Π(P ∗, A∗ | L). Thus, for ε > 0 and suﬃciently small, the
maximum function in (5.1) is strictly lower when evaluated at ψ(c∗ + ε) than
when evaluated at (P ∗, A∗), and the second claim is established.
A third claim is that (P ∗, A∗) = ψ(cm) where cm ∈ (L,H) is defined in (5.2)
as that value of c ∈ (L,H) such that ψ(c) induces kL = kH . Under Lemma 2.2,
cm is unique. Assume to the contrary that (P ∗, A∗) = ψ(c) for some c ∈ (L,H)
such that λA = kL > kH . Then under Lemma 2.2 the maximum function in (5.1)
would be strictly lower under the selection ψ(c − ε) for ε > 0 and suﬃciently
small. Likewise, assume to the contrary that (P ∗, A∗) = ψ(c) for some c ∈ (L,H)
such that λA = kH > kL. Then under Lemma 2.2 the maximum function in (5.1)
would be strictly lower under the selection ψ(c + ε) for ε > 0 and suﬃciently
small. The third claim is thus established.
Proof of Proposition 5.4: As argued in the text, ce < L under (5.4). Further,
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under (5.5), η > λ ≥ λA; thus, for all δ ∈ {η,λ} and t ∈ {L,H},
Π(ψ(cm) | t) + δeπt(bA) ≥ Π(ψ(t) | t) + δeπt(1), (10.1)
where a strict inequality holds when δ = η. In establishing that the proposed
specification satisfies (E1), the first step is to consider particular deviations.
Specifically, I establish first that no type {δ, t} could gain by deviating to (i)
the equilibrium selection intended for some other type, where the belief associ-
ated with that deviation is then determined by (E2), or (ii) a monopoly selection,
ψ(t), for t ∈ {L,H}, when b(ψ(t)) = 1. Note that neither of the two monopoly
selections is adopted by any type of incumbent in an intuitive equilibrium of Kind
A; thus, the beliefs associated with such selections are not restricted by (E2).
Consider type (L, η). As shown in the proof of Lemma 5.3, λA < η follows from
ce < H, and so type (L, η) strictly prefers (ψ(ce), 0) to (ψ(cm), bA). Using this
finding, (10.1) and η > λ, it thus follows that bΠ(L, η) = Π(ψ(ce) | L) + ηeπL(0) >
Π(ψ(cm) | L)+ηeπL(bA) > Π(ψ(L) | L)+ηeπL(1) > Π(ψ(H) | L)+ηeπL(1). Consider
type (H, η). This type is indiﬀerent between selecting ψ(cm) and deviating to
ψ(ce). Further, by (10.1) and η > λ, this type strictly prefers (ψ(cm), bA) to
(ψ(H), 1) and thus (ψ(L), 1). Consider type (H,λ). It is easily confirmed that
bΠ(H,λ) = Π(ψ(cm) | H) + λeπH(bA)
= Π(ψ(ce) | H) + λeπH(0) + (η − λ)[eπH(0)− eπH(bA)]
> Π(ψ(ce) | H) + λeπH(0),
and so type (H,λ) strictly prefers (ψ(cm), bA) to (ψ(ce), 0). Using (10.1), it also
follows that type (H,λ) prefers (ψ(cm), bA) to (ψ(H), 1) and thus (ψ(L), 1). Fi-
nally, consider type (L,λ). As in the proof of Lemma 5.3, (5.4) ensures thatbΠ(L,λ) = Π(ψ(cm) | L) + λeπL(bA) ≥ Π(ψ(ce) | L) + λeπL(0). Thus, type (L,λ)
does not gain by deviating from ψ(cm) to ψ(ce). Finally, under (10.1), type (L,λ)
also prefers (ψ(cm), bA) to (ψ(L), 1) and thus (ψ(H), 1).
The next step is to specify beliefs. By (E2), b(ψ(ce)) = 0 < bA = b(ψ(cm)). For
(P,A) /∈ {ψ(ce),ψ(cm)}, beliefs are specified as follows: if Π(P,A | H)+ηeπH(0) <
Π(ψ(cm) | H) + ηeπH(bA), then b(P,A) = 0; and if Π(P,A | H) + ηeπH(0) ≥
Π(ψ(cm) | H) + ηeπH(bA), then b(P,A) = 1. Since bΠ(H, η) = Π(ψ(cm) | H) +
ηeπH(bA), (P,A) in the first (second) set are (not) equilibrium dominated for type
(H, η). Note (P,A) in the first set are also equilibrium dominated for type (H,λ) :
bΠ(H,λ) = Π(ψ(cm) | H) + λeπH(bA)
> Π(P,A | H) + λeπH(0) + (η − λ)(eπH(0)− eπH(bA))
> Π(P,A | H) + λeπH(0).
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It is now straightforward to confirm that this specification satisfies (E3).
The final step is to confirm that (E1) holds. Given the beliefs, the most
tempting deviation for types (H, η) and (H,λ) is ψ(H). As shown above, however,
each of these types prefers (ψ(cm), bA) to (ψ(H), 1). Consider type (L, η). Over the
range of (P,A) for which b(P,A) 6= 0, the only potentially attractive deviations
are ψ(L) and ψ(cm); however, as shown above, each of these options oﬀers a
strictly lower payoﬀ than ψ(ce). For (P,A) such that b(P,A) = 0, type (H, η)
strictly prefers (ψ(ce), 0) to (P,A, 0). A patient incumbent would have the same
preference if its cost level were ce. Given that ce < L, it follows from Lemma
2.4 that type (L, η) also strictly prefers (ψ(ce), 0) to (P,A, 0). Last, consider
type (L,λ). Over the range of (P,A) for which b(P,A) = 1, the most tempting
deviation is ψ(L), which as shown above does not oﬀer a gain. Fix (P,A) such
that b(P,A) = 0. It is established above that type (L,λ) prefers (ψ(cm), bA) to
(ψ(ce), 0). Further, as just shown, type (L, η) strictly prefers (ψ(ce), 0) to (P,A, 0);
thus, (L,λ) also strictly prefers (ψ(ce), 0) to (P,A, 0).
Proof of Proposition 6.3: I establish first that no type {δ, t} could gain by
deviating to (i) the equilibrium selection intended for some other type, where the
belief associated with that deviation is determined by (E2), or (ii) the monopoly
selection, ψ(L), when b(ψ(L)) = 1. Note that ψ(H) is selected in an intuitive
equilibrium of Kind B; thus, b(ψ(H)) is determined by (E2).
Consider type (H, η). By (2.1), this type is indiﬀerent between (ψ(H), 1) and
(ψ(co), 0). This type strictly prefers (ψ(H), 1) to (ψ(L), 1). Consider type (H,λ):
bΠ(H,λ) = Π(ψ(H) | H) + λeπH(1)
= Π(ψ(co) | H) + λeπH(0) + (η − λ)[eπH(0)− eπH(1)]
> Π(ψ(co) | H) + λeπH(0).
Thus, type (H,λ) strictly prefers (ψ(H), 1) and (ψ(co), 0). This type also strictly
prefers (ψ(H), 1) to (ψ(L), 1). Consider type (L,λ):
Π(ψ(co) | L) + λeπL(0) ≥ Π(ψ(L) | L) + λeπL(1) (10.2)
holds if and only if λ ≥ λB. Hence, given λ ≥ λB, type (L,λ) prefers (ψ(co), 0) to
(ψ(L), 1) and thus (ψ(H), 1). Finally, consider type (L, η). As established using
Lemma 2.4 in the first step of the proof of Proposition 3.3, type (L, η) strictly
prefers (ψ(co), 0) to (ψ(L), 1) and thus (ψ(H), 1) .
The next step is to specify beliefs. By (E2), b(ψ(H)) = 1 > 0 = b(ψ(co)). For
(P,A) /∈ {ψ(co),ψ(H)}, beliefs are specified as follows: if Π(P,A | H)+ηeπH(0) <
Π(ψ(H) | H)+ηeπH(1), then b(P,A) = 0; and if Π(P,A | H)+ηeπH(0) ≥ Π(ψ(H) |
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H) + ηeπH(1), then b(P,A) = 1. Since bΠ(H, η) = Π(ψ(H) | H) + ηeπH(1), (P,A)
in the first (second) set are (not) equilibrium dominated for type (H, η). Observe
that (P,A) in the first set are also equilibrium dominated for type (H,λ) :bΠ(H,λ) = Π(ψ(H) | H) + λeπH(1)
> Π(P,A | H) + ηeπH(0)− (η − λ)eπH(1)
> Π(P,A | H) + λeπH(0).
It is now straightforward to confirm that this specification satisfies (E3).
The final step is to confirm that (E1) holds. Given the beliefs, types (H, η)
and (H,λ) clearly cannot gain by deviating. Consider type (L, η). For (P,A) such
that b(P,A) = 1, the most attractive deviation is ψ(L). But as shown above type
(L, η) strictly prefers (ψ(co), 0) to (ψ(L), 1). For (P,A) such that b(P,A) = 0, type
(H, η) strictly prefers (ψ(co), 0) to (P,A, 0). A patient incumbent would have the
same preference if its cost level were co. Given co < L, it follows from Lemma
2.4 that type (L, η) also strictly prefers (ψ(co), 0) to (P,A, 0). Last, consider type
(L,λ). For (P,A) such that b(P,A) = 1, the most tempting deviation is ψ(L),
which as established in (10.2) above does not oﬀer a gain when λ ≥ λB. Fix
(P,A) such that b(P,A) = 0. As just shown, type (L, η) strictly prefers (ψ(co), 0)
to (P,A, 0); thus, (L,λ) also strictly prefers (ψ(co), 0) to (P,A, 0).
Proof of Proposition 7.4: To begin, I confirm that ce < L. This follows imme-
diately from Lemma 2.2, given that ce is here defined by Π(ψ(ce) | H)+ηeπH(0) =
Π(ψ(L) | H) + ηeπH(bC) and bC > 0. To establish that the proposed specification
satisfies (E1), the first step is to consider particular deviations. I establish first
that no type {δ, t} could gain by deviating to the equilibrium selection intended
for some other type, where the associated belief is determined by (E2). Note that
each of the two monopoly selections is adopted by some type of incumbent in the
proposed intuitive equilibrium of Kind C.
Consider type (H, η). By the definition of ce, this type is indiﬀerent be-
tween (ψ(L), bC) and (ψ(ce), 0). Under (7.5), this type also prefers (ψ(L), bC) and
(ψ(H), 1). Consider type (L,λ). This type strictly prefers (ψ(L), bC) to (ψ(H), 1);
further, under (7.6), this type prefers (ψ(L), bC) to (ψ(ce), 0). Consider type
(H,λ). Using (7.7), bΠ(H,λ) = Π(ψ(H) | H) + λeπH(1)
≥ Π(ψ(L) | H) + λeπH(bC)
> Π(ψ(ce) | H) + λeπH(0).
Thus type (H,λ) prefers (ψ(H), 1) to (ψ(L), bC) and thus (ψ(ce), 0). Finally,
consider type (L, η). As shown in the proof of Lemma 7.2, λC < η follows from
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ce < H, and so type (L, η) strictly prefers (ψ(ce), 0) to (ψ(L), bC) and thus to
(ψ(H), 1).
The next step is to specify beliefs. By (E2), b(ψ(ce)) = 0, b(ψ(L)) = bC and
b(ψ(H)) = 1. For (P,A) /∈ {ψ(ce),ψ(L),ψ(H)}, beliefs are specified as follows:
if Π(P,A | H) + ηeπH(0) < Π(ψ(L) | H) + ηeπH(bC), then b(P,A) = 0; and
if Π(P,A | H) + ηeπH(0) ≥ Π(ψ(L) | H) + ηeπH(bC), then b(P,A) = 1. SincebΠ(H, η) = Π(ψ(L) | H) + ηeπH(bC), (P,A) in the first (second) set are (not)
equilibrium dominated for type (H, η). Observe that (P,A) in the first set are
also equilibrium dominated for type (H,λ) :
bΠ(H,λ) = Π(ψ(H) | H) + λeπH(1)
≥ Π(ψ(L) | H) + λeπH(bC)
> Π(P,A | H) + ηeπH(0)− (η − λ)eπH(bC)
> Π(P,A | H) + λeπH(0),
where the first inequality uses (7.7). Thus, the specification satisfies (E3).
The final step is to verify that (E1) holds. Given the belief specification, if an
incumbent with cost type t considers a deviation to some (P,A) /∈ {ψ(ce),ψ(L),ψ(H)}
for which b(P,A) = 1, then the incumbent would do better by selecting ψ(t).
Types (H,λ) and (L,λ) already adopt their monopoly selections, and it is shown
above that types (H, η) and (L, η) cannot gain by deviating to their respec-
tive monopoly selections. Next, fix any (P,A) /∈ {ψ(ce),ψ(L),ψ(H)} for which
b(P,A) = 0. As established above, any such deviant selection is equilibrium dom-
inated for types (H, η) and (H,λ). Further, Π(P,A | H) + ηeπH(0) < Π(ψ(L) |
H) + ηeπH(bC) = Π(ψ(ce) | H) + ηeπH(0). Thus, type (H, η) strictly prefers
(ψ(ce), 0) to (P,A, 0). A patient incumbent with cost level ce would also strictly
prefer (ψ(ce), 0) to (P,A, 0). Given ce < L, by Lemma 2.4, type (L, η) strictly
prefers (ψ(ce), 0) to (P,A, 0). Consider type (L,λ). It is established above that
type (L,λ) prefers (ψ(L), bC) to (ψ(ce), 0). Further, as just shown, type (L, η)
strictly prefers (ψ(ce), 0) to (P,A, 0); thus, (L,λ) also strictly prefers (ψ(ce), 0)
to (P,A, 0).
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Figure 1: Iso-payoff curves illustrating different
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